


# MILITARY AFFAIRS

Vol. XI, No. 4

Winter 1947





### *Guerilla History*

A curious sidelight in the writing of the official history of World War II recently came to the attention of the Army Historical Division in the form of a crude leaflet, typed in red ink on both sides of rough buff paper, and tied together with hand twisted twine. The odd looking document was a directive outlining the administrative and editorial functions of the Sixth Military District (Philippine Army) historical unit, charging it with an ambitious program of writing the history of the war in Panay, one of the central islands in the Philippine group. This inspiring display of farsightedness on the part of a small force fighting guerilla warfare in the heart of enemy-held territory in the spring of 1944, intent at this difficult time in preserving for the outside world an accurate account of its super-secret part in winning the war, should be of interest to all historians. It will appeal especially to the American historians who served in the Pacific and who knew well the ups-and-downs in the every day struggle for adequate personnel, transport, tent space, and for greater recognition of the importance of the work they were doing.

The guerilla historical unit was organized in the spring of 1943 and was reorganized by the above order. It cited the disastrous loss of all records to enemy action in September 1943 and the need to start its work once again from the beginning. The proposed number of volumes was not mentioned, but writing would fall within three main divisions; general, social and economic, and military history. The greatest emphasis was placed on "devoted scholarship" by this crude looking "revised technical plan" composed in the hidden jungle headquarters. "All data **MUST** be accurate, sources carefully indicated for double-checking, and utmost secrecy discipline and care for all records must be observed," it stated. Among the sub-topics to be covered were "Raids and ambushes," "Massacres and atrocities by enemy," "Fifth-columnism," "Puppetry," and "Guerilla Emergency Money." There were also sections on "Intelligence," to tell the story of secret operatives; "Communications and transportation," embracing code systems; mountain trail foot-courier service, man and animal power utilized; "Contact with neighbor islands, Australia and America," details of the first contact, MacArthur-Peralta contact, Queson-Peralta contact, and intelligence of enemy shipping.

It is not known if the history of "The War in Panay" was completed and submitted for publication.



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
FREDERICK P. TODD

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**COVER:** "Attack on the Monastery of Churubusco," by James Walker, noted American battle artist who was born in London, reared in the United States and later lived in Mexico and South America. During Scott's campaign from Veracruz to Mexico City, Walker was imprisoned in the Mexican capital but managed to escape and join the American Army in Puebla. From here he continued with Scott back to Mexico City, and during that time made a series of small oil paintings of the battles he witnessed. He is best known for his monumental painting of the Battle of Chapultepec which is displayed in the National Capitol, Washington, D. C., and has also received considerable recognition for military scenes he painted during the Civil War. Walker died near the end of the nineteenth century in Watsonville, Calif.

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HOWARD  
BRUCE  
CONDAGENNAL

Hand-carrying supplies through the dense jungle of Guadalcanal



## CRISIS ON GUADALCANAL\*

By JOHN MILLER, JR.

### Summary of the Situation

By October 1942 the situation of the 1st Marine Division, Reinforced, on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands had become extremely serious. Under command of Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division had landed on Guadalcanal and the small islands of Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Makambo on August 7, 1942, and the next day seized its major objective—the airfield near the mouth of the Lunga River on Guadalcanal's north coast which Japanese pioneers had been constructing. But this initial success had been of short duration. Japanese naval forces sailed from Rabaul on New Britain, 565 nautical miles northwest of the Lunga River, to surprise and defeat the Allied screening warships in the battle off Savo Island during the night of August 8-9. At the same time aircraft losses and fuel shortages forced the carrier task forces supporting the landing to withdraw. The ships of the Amphibious Force had been required, therefore, to retire from Guadalcanal before the transports had been completely unloaded.

The marines at Lunga Point, 552 nautical miles northwest of the nearest Allied base—the primitive Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides—had been virtually stranded. They

lacked air cover and sufficient supplies, rations, ammunition, and engineering equipment. During August and September naval forces occasionally brought supplies and reinforcements to Guadalcanal from New Caledonia and the New Hebrides, but these efforts were not sufficient to provide General Vandegrift with enough troops to drive the Japanese off the island. As a result the marines were confined to a small area around the airfield, while Japanese air, naval, and ground forces were free to operate outside the airfield perimeter. American naval forces, inferior in strength to the Japanese, had not been able to destroy the enemy forces.

The focal point of the 1st Marine Division's defenses was therefore the airstrip by the Lunga. Completed by division engineers, Henderson Field (as the runway had been named) was primitive, lacking adequate dispersal facilities, revetments, fuel storage tanks, and machine shops. All aircraft had to be loaded with bombs by hand, and refuelled from gasoline drums by hand-pumps. Despite these difficulties and the high attrition rate caused by daily combat and enemy bombardments, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Brig. Gen. Roy S. Geiger commanding) was maintaining an average of about fifty operational aircraft at the field by October—F4F's (Wildcat fighters), SBD's (Dauntless dive-bombers), P-400's and P-39's (Airacobras) and a few TBF's (Avenger torpedo bombers). These belonged to Marine Aircraft Group 23, to the 67th (Army)

\*This article by Dr. Miller will compose chapter six in the volume *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*, part of the series in the *Official History of the U. S. Army in World War II* being prepared by the Historical Division, Department of the Army, with whose permission it appears in MILITARY AFFAIRS. The Guadalcanal volume is expected to be published in 1948 at the Government Printing Office.

LUNGA POINT


Sector

3d Defense Battalion

Activity in  
Columbiana

POINT CRUIZ

4th Int and Tk Co  
attached on  
21 and 23 Oct.





Fighter Squadron, and to carrier groups from the *Enterprise*, *Saratoga*, *Wasp*, and *Hornet*. No heavy bombers had yet been based at Henderson Field, although when gasoline stocks, always a critical factor in Guadalcanal air operations, were sufficient B-17's (Flying Fortresses) of the 11th (Army) Heavy Bombardment Group in the New Hebrides occasionally staged through Henderson Field, refuelling there to enable them to strike targets in the northern Solomons more effectively. While Henderson Field planes could fly, the Japanese seldom dared to operate ships within their range during daylight. Thus the Japanese attacks were all directed against the airfield, a potential threat to Rabaul. The marine defenses were disposed to protect the field against attacks from all directions.

The Americal Division's 164th Infantry, Col. Bryant E. Moore commanding, landed on Guadalcanal on October 13 to come under General Vandegrift's control. The attachment of this regiment—the first army ground force unit to engage the Japanese on Guadalcanal—increased the strength of the reinforced 1st Marine Division to 26,348 officers and enlisted men. Of these, 3,260 were on the north side of Sealark Channel on Tulagi and adjacent islets. The balance—23,088—were defending Henderson Field, for General Vandegrift had immediately committed the 164th to the perimeter around the airstrip. The defenses of the area consisted of a five-sector perimeter, 22,000 yards long, which ran along Kukum and Lunga Beaches, the Ilu River Line, and a long stretch of rough jungled ravines and ridges on the inland (south) side. Each sector commander retained one infantry battalion in sector reserve, available for commitment by division headquarters if necessary.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the

motorized division reserve, then the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, was kept in a constant state of readiness. Battalions of the division artillery regiment, the 11th Marines (Col. Pedro A. del Valle commanding), were grouped within the perimeter to support all sectors. The 3d Defense Battalion and the 1st Special Weapons Battalion were assigned responsibility for beach and antiaircraft defense, reinforced at night by amphibian tractor, engineer, and pioneer troops.

To help secure the airfield from artillery fire and to keep enemy tanks west of the Matanikau River, the marines had also established the so-called Forward Battle Position on the east bank to cover the river mouth, about 3,000 yards beyond the westernmost sector of the Lunga perimeter. A sandbar across the mouth afforded the only means by which tanks, trucks, and heavy artillery could get across the formidable Matanikau, which flows through deep canyons into Sealark Channel. About 2,000 yards in length, the horse-shoe shaped forward position was held by two infantry battalions and 37-mm. antitank guns and 75-mm. selfpropelled tank destroyers. As there were not enough troops to hold the beach and jungle between the Matanikau and the Lunga perimeter, patrols covered the gaps.

The Japanese had attempted to dislodge the marines from their defenses around the airfield on two occasions prior to the arrival of the 164th Infantry. About one thousand men under Col. Kiyono Ichiki attempted to force a passage west across the mouth of the Ilu River in August, and in September a larger force commanded by Maj. Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi tried to reach the airfield by attacking northward over Bloody or Edson's Ridge—the low, open ridge south of the airstrip and east of the Lunga. These attacks, by totally inadequate forces, had failed; Japanese intelligence had grossly underestimated the size and capabilities of the

<sup>1</sup>1st Mar Div, Rpt Guadalcanal Opn (5 sections), V, (Jul 1 '43), 15.

American garrison. Maj. Gen. Shuicho Miyazaki wrote later that while in Tokyo prior to becoming 17th Army Chief of Staff, he had lacked exact knowledge of American strength. "Does the American force," he asked himself, "which landed on Guadalcanal on August 7th represent the entire enemy force committed to the campaign, or is it only the spearhead of a large counter-offensive? If it is the former, our operations will most certainly be successful. But if it is the latter victory or defeat hangs in the balance."<sup>2</sup>

When the Japanese had planned their Southwest and South Pacific operations in the spring of 1942, Miyazaki wrote, they desired to sever the line of communications between the United States and Australia with two separate campaigns. One had as its goal Port Moresby in New Guinea, while the advance through the Solomons had aimed toward the Fijis, Samoa, and New Caledonia. The Allied counter-attack in August, however, had turned these separate operations into a single campaign.

#### GENERAL JAPANESE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

The Japanese at Rabaul raised their estimate of American strength on Guadalcanal after August, but still made serious miscalculations. The 17th Army, on September 19, had believed that 7,500 American troops were holding the Lunga.<sup>3</sup> Actually U. S. strength on Guadalcanal at the end of September had been 19,251,<sup>4</sup> rising to over 23,000 on October 13.

At Rabaul Lt. Gen. Fusayasu Hyakutake, commanding the 17th Army, had been preparing elaborate plans, on the basis of these estimates, for the recapture of the Lunga area. The first plan, issued on August 28 and altered several times afterward, established the basic concept for the October counter-offensive. The *Kawaguchi Force* was to secure positions east and west of the Matanikau to cover the projected landing by the 2d Division, to secure a line of departure, and to harass the Lunga defenders while an artillery force prepared to neutralize Henderson Field. The 17th Army would arrange for the transport of the necessary troops from Rabaul. General Hyakutake was to go to Guadalcanal to assume command of the troops in person. Once the assault troops had reached Guadalcanal and completed their preparations for the attack, they were to "... capture the enemy positions, especially the airfield and artillery positions at one blow." Hyakutake also considered sending one force in an amphibious assault "behind the enemy."<sup>5</sup> "The operation," he grandiloquently announced, "to surround and recapture Guadalcanal will truly decide the fate of the control of the entire Pacific area. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

The recapture of the Lunga delta was to be followed by the seizure of the other islands in the southern Solomons, while 17th Army reserve forces and the Imperial Navy intensified the attacks against General MacArthur's force in New Guinea. Port Moresby was to be taken by the end of November.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Maj. Gen. Shuicho Miyazaki, Personal Account of His Experiences during the Solomons Campaign, p. 1. (Translated by ATIS, SCAP.) At the author's request, SCAP historians and translators in Tokyo in 1946 interrogated some of the Japanese survivors of the Guadalcanal campaign and forwarded the results to the author along with Miyazaki's narrative.

<sup>3</sup>ATIS, SWPA, Enemy Pub No 28, July 21, '43, Int Record No 33: Int Rpts, *Yazawa Butai and Oki Shudan* (17th Army) Gp Hq, Mar 8-Dec 30 '42, p. 93.

<sup>4</sup>1st Mar Div Rpt, V, Personnel Annex W, 2.

<sup>5</sup>ATIS, SCAP, translation, interr (author's request) of Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama, Maj. Gen. Shuicho Miyazaki, Maj. Gen. Haruo Konuma, and Lt. Col. Norikuni Tajima, Aug 31, '46, and Appendix by 1st Demob Bur, Summary 17th Army Plans.

<sup>6</sup>Hq, USAFISPA, AC/S, G-2: Japanese Campaign in the Guadalcanal Area, Aug 7, '34, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup>17th Army Opn Order, Oct 5, '42, in Amer Div, Int Annex to Combat Experience Rpt, Guadalcanal, Tab C, Appendix 12.



The Japanese had decided to finish the Guadalcanal campaign before reinforcing their troops in New Guinea because the strategic importance of Guadalcanal prevented planes, warships, and troop transports from being sent from the Solomons to New Guinea.<sup>8</sup>

The counter-offensive against Henderson Field was to be a joint operation. In September 17th Army representatives had met at Truk with the commanders of the *Combined and Southeastern Fleets* to plan the attack, tentatively set for October 21.<sup>9</sup> Japanese warships were to cooperate fully for two weeks following the landing of the assault troops on Guadalcanal.

Drawing troops from China, the East Indies, the Philippines, and Truk, by mid-October the Japanese had assembled a strong force in Rabaul and the Solomons for the Guadalcanal—New Guinea operations: two infantry divisions; one infantry brigade; one reinforced infantry battalion; three independent antiaircraft artillery battalions; three field antiaircraft artillery battalions; one field antiaircraft artillery battery; one heavy field artillery regiment plus extra batteries; one tank regiment plus one company; one independent mountain artillery regiment plus one battalion; one engineer regiment; one trench mortar battalion; and a reconnaissance plane unit.<sup>10</sup> Of these, the brigade and the reinforced infantry battalion (*Kawaguchi* and *Ichiki Forces*) and part of one infantry regiment had already met defeat on Guadalcanal.

The 2d and 38th Divisions, the main infantry forces which had been assembled, had formerly belonged to the 16th Army. The 2d Division had been recruited in the city of Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture in Honshu.

Shipped to Manchuria in 1937, the 2d Division did border and garrison duty until 1940, when it returned to Japan. The following year the division was transferred back to Manchuria. Then a square division, its infantry components consisted of the 4th, 16th, 29th, and 30th Infantry Regiments until the division was made triangular with the detachment of the 30th Infantry. In March 1942 the division moved to Java to garrison that island. In July 1942 the 4th Infantry was detached for service in the Philippines, while the 16th and 29th Regiments remained in Java. In August 1942 the entire division was transferred to Rabaul and the Shortland Islands.

The 38th Division was organized in September 1939 in Nagoya in the Aichi Prefecture in Honshu. A triangular division, it consisted of the 228th, 229th, and 230th Infantry Regiments. After a training period it had been sent to China in 1941 and took part in the siege of Hong Kong, after which its regiments were detached. The reinforced 228th Infantry, under Maj. Gen. Takeo Ito, assisted in capturing Amboina and Timor. One battalion of the 229th Infantry also helped to take Timor, while the remainder of the regiment campaigned in Sumatra. The 230th Infantry served in the Java campaign. The division then reassembled at Rabaul in late September 1942. The 4th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (15-cm. howitzers) was dispatched from China in September 1942, arriving at Rabaul in early October.<sup>11</sup>

Although the 17th Army was composed of veteran regiments, it is quite significant that it had never before operated as one unit. Likewise, the infantry divisions had seldom fought as divisions. Individual regiments and battalions had campaigned actively, but

<sup>8</sup>Miyazaki, Personal Account, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup>U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Interrogations of Japanese Officials* (OPNAV-P-03-100, 2 vols.), II, 468.

<sup>10</sup>1st Demob Bur's OB, 17th Army.

<sup>11</sup>XIV Corps, *Enemy Opns on Guadalcanal*, Apr 24 '43: 2d Div Information, 38th Div Hist, and 17th Army OB.

had never fought against a foe who possessed superior numbers, equipment, and strong defensive positions.

The movement of Japanese Army forces from Rabaul and the northern Solomons to Guadalcanal, already begun in August, increased rapidly during September and October. By destroyer, by landing craft, by cargo ship and transport, the enemy soldiers sailed down the inter-island channels to land on the beaches west of the Matanikau River under cover of darkness, while destroyers covered the landings by bombarding the Lunga delta. The U. S. Naval forces which might have opposed them had generally been too few in number to risk in action north of Guadalcanal, and at night the darkness and clouds helped to hide the Japanese ships from Henderson Field aircraft. By mid-October General Hyakutake had assembled a sizable portion of his army, except the 38th Division's main body, on Guadalcanal. The 2d Division and two battalions of the 38th Division were ready to operate in conjunction with the survivors of the *Ichiki* and *Kawaguchi* Forces. In addition there were present one regiment and three batteries of heavy field artillery; two battalions and one battery of field antiaircraft artillery; one battalion and one battery of mountain artillery; one mortar battalion; one tank company; three rapid fire gun battalions, and engineer, transport, and medical troops. Those forces, although below full strength, represented the largest concentration of Japanese troops on Guadalcanal at any one time—about 25,000 men.<sup>12</sup>

While the 17th Army troops had been landing on Guadalcanal's north coast, Japanese naval forces had been preparing to execute their part of the plan. The strongest

Japanese naval force since Midway<sup>13</sup> had left Truk for the Rabaul area for the offensive. Small bomber forces from the Southwest Pacific had been attacking Rabaul regularly, but had inflicted little damage.<sup>14</sup> Submarines had deployed southward in August to try to cut the thin American supply lines leading to Guadalcanal from the bases to the south, and warships had been escorting convoys to Guadalcanal and shelling Henderson Field almost every night.

#### BOMBARDMENT OF HENDERSON FIELD

Naval forces under the South Pacific Area commander (COMSOPAC) had been weakened by previous engagements, but determined to try to stop the nightly naval bombardments and the flow of enemy reinforcements, he ordered four cruisers and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Norman Scott to sail from Espiritu Santo by way of the southwest coast of Guadalcanal to Savo Island. Admiral Scott was to intercept any Japanese naval units moving on Guadalcanal and to cover the left flank of the convoy carrying the 164th Infantry to Guadalcanal.

Patrolling planes from Henderson Field discovered a Japanese force sailing south toward Guadalcanal at 1345, October 11. The Japanese had sent this force—four cruisers and one destroyer—to neutralize Henderson Field to provide greater safety for the landing of more troops and supplies.<sup>15</sup> Acting on information from the air patrol, Admiral Scott's force reached Cape Esperance on October 11, shortly before midnight. At 2346, October 11, the force located the enemy ships north of the cape. The American ships opened fire immediately, and in thirty-four minutes of action forced the enemy to retire,

<sup>12</sup>U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Campaigns of the Pacific War* (Washington, 1946), p. 119.

<sup>14</sup>Miyazaki, *Personal Account*, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup>U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Campaigns of the Pacific War*, Appendix 42, p. 117; *Interrogations*, II, 456.

<sup>12</sup>USAFISPA's Japanese Campaign estimates 22,000, pp. 16-17; XIV Corps, *Enemy Opns*, estimates 25-28,000, in *17th Army Hist*.





Infantryman in his foxhole on Guadalcanal

sinking one of his cruisers and the destroyer and damaging a second cruiser. Admiral Scott lost one destroyer sunk and two cruisers and one destroyer damaged.

The victory at Cape Esperance, whose flames had lit the night skies west of the Lunga, cheered the men in the perimeter, but its effects were short-lived. Two days afterward, the Japanese struck the airfield with the most damaging blows of the campaign. At noon on October 13, while the 164th Infantry was landing, twenty-two Japanese twin-engined bombers with fighter escort, flying over at 30,000 feet, bombed the field. The Wildcat Fighters had not been

warned in time to climb to that altitude to intercept, and the P-39 Airacobras could not fly higher than 27,000 feet. The P-400's, valuable for the close support of ground troops, could not climb over 12,000 feet. Bombers struck again at 1330 while all the American fighters were on the ground being refuelled. Several American planes were damaged, and the runway pitted with bomb craters in spite of the best efforts of the 6th Naval Construction Battalion. Using trucks loaded with earth in advance, the Seabees raced over the field between attacks to try to fill craters, but without complete success. General Geiger was forced to broadcast the

news that Henderson Field could not be used by B-17's except in cases of extreme necessity.<sup>16</sup>

Late in the afternoon, after the last Japanese bombers had retired, the 15-cm. howitzers which Hyakutake's men had been landing opened fire from positions near Kokumbona. "Pistol Pete," as the American troops called the howitzers, first made Kukum Beach untenable, then concentrated on the airfield. The 1st Marine Division had no sound-and-flash units, nor any counter-battery artillery with which to reply effectively. The field artillery battalions of the 11th Marines were armed with 75-mm. pack and 105-mm. howitzers, and the 3d Defense Battalion had emplaced 5-inch seacoast guns on the beach. On October 13 and the days that followed, the 5-inch guns and the 105-mm. howitzers attempted to silence Pistol Pete. But the trajectory of the 5-inch guns was too flat, and the 105's were too light, for effective counter-battery fire although some of the 105's moved up to the Matanikau River to shoot.<sup>17</sup>

Shortly before 2400, October 13, a Japanese naval task force which included the battleships *Haruna* and *Kongo* entered Sealark Channel. While a cruiser plane flew over the field dropping flares, the task force bombarded the Lunga delta for eighty minutes, the heaviest shelling by Japanese forces during the campaign. The battleships fired 918 rounds of 36-cm. ammunition, of which 625 were armor-piercing, and 293 were high explosive. Explosions and burning gasoline illuminated the whole area. In the words of a Japanese report, "Explosions were seen

everywhere, and the entire airfield was a sea of flame."<sup>18</sup> Forty-one Americans were killed, over half the ninety planes assigned to Henderson Field wrecked or damaged, and the runway further pitted. By October 14, Henderson Field was out of action.

Fortunately the Seabees had recently laid out Fighter Strip No. 1, a rough, grassy strip about 1,000 yards southeast of the main runway. This unmatted strip was suitable only for light planes in dry weather, but was to serve as the main air base for a week.

Seven 9-10,000 ton Japanese transports, escorted by warships, were reported by patrolling SBD's to be sailing southward from the northern Solomons toward Guadalcanal on October 14. Enough American planes were able to take the air from Fighter Strip No. 1 to sink one transport and set fire to another. But the fall of darkness protected the rest of the convoy from further attacks, and when day broke on October 15 the marines and soldiers at Lunga Point could see five of the Japanese transports and their eleven escorting warships as they lay ten miles away at Tassafaronga Point, unloading troops, supplies, weapons, and ammunition.<sup>19</sup> There was then hardly enough aviation gasoline to get General Geiger's twenty-seven operational planes into the air. A feverish search of wrecked planes and the jungles around the field for extra gas yielded about 400 drums, or about two days' supply.<sup>20</sup> Fighters and dive-bombers then rose to attack the enemy ships, and despite anti-aircraft fire and Zero fighters, had sunk one transport and set two more ablaze by 1100. The remaining Japanese ships then put out to sea,

<sup>16</sup>War Diary, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, 1 May '42-Dec 31, '42: COMAIRWING I to all CG's Island Bases, 0217 (Z time) of Oct 13, '42. This war diary will be cited hereafter as the SOPAC War Diary.

<sup>17</sup>3d Def Bn, Guadalcanal Action Rpt, Mar 7 '43; 1st Mar Div Rpt, V, Arty Annex R, 1; Brig. Gen. Pedro A. del Valle, "Marine Field Artillery on Guadalcanal," *Field Artillery Journal*, XXXIII, No. 1 (October 1943), 730.

<sup>18</sup>ATIS, SCAP, Hist Rpts, Naval Opns: Rpt Bombardment Allied Beachhead on Guadalcanal, Apr 5, '46 (Doc No 16567-B).

<sup>19</sup>1st Mar Div. Rpt, V, 16: SOPAC War Diary. CG 1st Mar Div to COMSOPAC, 0005 (Z time) of Oct 16, '42; U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Allied Campaign Against Rabaul* (September 1946), p. 44. The latter source asserts that there were six ships unloading.

<sup>20</sup>1st Mar Div Rpt, V, Logistics Annex Z, 10.



attacked by both Guadalcanal aircraft and by B-17's and SBD's which had flown up from Espiritu Santo. One ship fell victim to the B-17's near Savo Island.

To build up the depleted gasoline stocks, Army and Marine Corps cargo planes flew drums of gas from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal, despite the shellfire that was still hitting the airfields. The Navy seaplane tender *MacFarland* also ran a deckload of drums in, but was seriously damaged in Sealark Channel by enemy air action on October 16.

The air attacks had cost the Japanese transports heavily, but they had succeeded in landing 80 per cent of their cargo and all the passenger troops, between 3,000 and 4,000 men.<sup>21</sup> These soldiers were part of the 230th Infantry and seven companies of the 16th Infantry, the last Japanese infantry units to land prior to the opening of the infantry assaults against the Lunga perimeter.

That the Japanese were preparing to attack in force was all too obvious. General Vandegrift had previously asked COMSOPAC for more air and surface support. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (COMSOPAC) had asked that Southwest Pacific aircraft search the western approaches to the Solomons to locate any approaching enemy carriers, and when B-17's had been forced off Henderson Field, Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, Commander, Aircraft, South Pacific, had suggested that Southwest Pacific aircraft intensify their attacks on Rabaul, Kahili, and Buka. Admiral Ghormley, on October 16, warned Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commanding the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, that the Japanese effort appeared to be full-scale. The South Pacific, he stated, urgently needed aviation reinforcements.<sup>22</sup>

South Pacific naval forces had, indeed, been seriously weakened by combat losses. The *Enterprise*, *Saratoga*, and *North Carolina* had previously left the area to be repaired at Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor had rushed repairs on the *Enterprise*, however, to such an extent that the veteran carrier was able to leave Pearl Harbor on October 16 with the *South Dakota* and nine destroyers to sail to the South Pacific.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, Admiral Fitch's force at Espiritu Santo had been increased to eighty-five patrol and heavy bombers.

#### JAPANESE TACTICAL PLANS

On Guadalcanal, General Hyakutake's units were preparing to assault the Lunga perimeter. The 17th Army issued tactical orders to the 2d Division on October 15. The main body of the 2d Division, then in the vicinity of Kokumbona, was to deliver a surprise attack against the south flank of the American position on X Day, then tentatively set for October 18. While the main body of the 2d Division was pushing inland to reach its line of departure south of the airfield, a force west of the Matanikau under command of Maj. Gen. Tadashi Sumiyoshi, commander of 17th Army artillery, was to cover the 2d Division's rear, divert the Americans, and shell the Lunga airfields and artillery positions. The amphibious attack by one battalion of the 228th Infantry was still part of the plan, but appears to have been discarded later. American morale and strength, the Japanese believed, were declining.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup>For a fuller account of naval action see ONI, USN, Combat Narratives, Solomon Islands Campaign, IV: Battle of Cape Esperance, Oct 11, '42; V, Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, Oct 26 '42 (1943).

<sup>24</sup>Interr of Maruyama, Miyazaki, Konuma, and Tajima, Appendix, Gist of 17th Army order of Oct 15, '42; XIV Corps translation, Feb 21, '43, of 2nd Div Plan. Both 17th Army and 2nd Div issued numerous orders during October, many of which revised the basic plan slightly. Later accounts by the Japanese officers concerned are often contradictory. The account given here, based on the above sources, may err in detail.

<sup>21</sup>Allied Campaign Against Rabaul, p. 44.

<sup>22</sup>SOPAC War Diary: CG 1st Mar Div to COMSOPAC, 1942 (Z time) of Oct 14 '42; COMSOPAC, 1730 of Oct 14, '42; COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC, 2225 of Oct 14, '42; COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, 0440 of Oct 16, '42.

The coast force under Sumiyoshi consisted of five infantry battalions of about 2,900 men, one tank company, fifteen 15-cm. howitzers, three 10-cm. guns, and seven field artillery pieces. The units involved were the 4th Infantry, two battalions of the 124th Infantry, the tank company, and artillerymen of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment of the 2d Division, and elements of the 4th, 7th, and 21st Heavy Field Artillery Regiments and the 10th Independent Mountain Artillery Battalion.

The force which, under Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama, commanding the 2d Division, was to attack Henderson Field from the south consisted of eight or nine infantry battalions, totalling 5,600 men, plus artillery, engineer, and medical troops. The right wing of Maruyama's force, under Kawaguchi's command, consisted of one battalion of the 124th Infantry, two battalions of the 230th Infantry, parts of the 3d Light Trench Mortar Battalion and the 6th and 9th Independent Rapid Fire Gun Battalions, the 20th Independent Mountain Artillery Battalion, and engineers and medical troops. The left wing, led by Maj. Gen. Yumio Nasu, was composed of the 29th Infantry, the 3d Light Trench Mortar Battalion (less detachments), the 2d Independent Rapid Fire Gun Battalion, the 2d Mountain Artillery Battalion, and engineers. In reserve were the 16th Infantry and additional engineer units.

Kawaguchi's wing, having worked inland from Kokumbona, was to attack northward from east of the Lunga under cover of darkness to capture the airfield and destroy the American forces east of the Lunga. Nasu's wing was to attack simultaneously northward from a point between Kawaguchi and the Lunga River.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup>ATIS, SCAP's reproduction of 1st Demob Bur's map of 17th Army opns; XIV Corps translation, Feb 21, '42; Gist of orders issued to 2nd Div, appendix to ATIS, SCAP and SCAP historians' inter of Hyakutake, Miyazaki, and Maruyama.

Supremely confident that these soldiers could retake the Lunga delta without the help of the main body of the 38th Division, held at Rabaul and the northern Solomons in readiness for operations in New Guinea,<sup>26</sup> Hyakutake directed his troops to continue "annihilating" the enemy until General Vandegrift, accompanied by staff officers, interpreters, one American flag and one white flag, had advanced along the coast road toward the Matanikau to surrender.<sup>27</sup>

In several respects Hyakutake's confidence was somewhat justified, for he enjoyed some significant advantages. The 15-cm. howitzers outweighed the heaviest American howitzers. Japanese warships were sailing into Sealark Channel with relative impunity almost nightly. The majority of the 25,000 Japanese troops were fresh, while many of General Vandegrift's 23,000 were suffering from malaria, dysentery, and malnutrition. The wide envelopment by Maruyama's division, leading it through jungled, mountainous terrain, would be hidden from ground and aerial observation. But the Americans were entrenched in prepared positions, were expecting attack, and could place artillery fire in front of any threatened sector of the perimeter. The Japanese had no airfields close by, and the American airplanes, though few in number, possessed local control of the air and limited the amount of heavy materiel which the Japanese could land. Hyakutake's army lacked sufficient transport. He had committed his main force to a wide enveloping march through virtually trackless jungle, with all the difficulties of communication, coordination, and control attendant upon such a maneuver. Finally, had the attacking forces been able to break through the perimeter defense—a bloody task—it seems doubtful that enough reserves were available to exploit the break-through.

<sup>26</sup>Inter of Hyakutake, Maruyama, and Miyazaki.

<sup>27</sup>XIV Corps, Enemy Opns, 17th Army Hist, p. 5.



To get troops, guns, ammunition, and supplies into position for the attack, engineers had been building roads leading from the various landing beaches eastward to Kokumbona. Engineers and combat troops had also begun work sometime in September on an inland trail by which the 2d Division was to get into position south of Henderson Field. This trail, usually known as the Maruyama Trail, ran southward from the 17th Army assembly area at Kokumbona, then turned east to cross the Matanikau and Lunga Rivers south of the hill mass (Mount Austen) about six miles southwest of Lunga Point, and followed the Lunga downstream (north) to a point near the American perimeter,<sup>28</sup> a distance of about fifteen miles. The Maruyama Trail led through the thickest of unexplored tropical jungles, where giant hardwood trees, vines, and undergrowth are so thick that a man can not walk upright nor see more than a few yards. The route south of Mount Austen led over an almost unbelievably tangled series of ridges and ravines. As sunlight never penetrates the tree-tops, the earth underfoot is wet and swampy. The Japanese had no heavy road-building equipment, but hacked their way by hand, using machetes, axes, and saws. At best they must have cleared only a path through the undergrowth, leaving the tree-tops undisturbed. The overhead growth provided security from aerial reconnaissance, and Mount Austen itself, plus the jungle, would conceal the force from the Lunga defenders.

Since the Japanese had brought no horses and almost no motor transport to Guadalcanal, supplies had to be brought forward by hand from as far away as Cape Esperance. Perhaps 800 tons of supplies were carried by hand to the forward dumps near Kokumbona. Artillery pieces were hauled along the Maruyama Trail by man-power.

General Maruyama also ordered each soldier to carry one shell on his person in addition to his regular equipment.<sup>29</sup>

The right wing of Maruyama's force, designated to lead the march through the jungle, assembled at Kokumbona on October 15 and 16. The next day the Maruyama force set out on its gruelling march toward the line of departure east of the Lunga River, ". . . crossing mountains and rivers with much difficulty due to the bad roads and heavy terrain."<sup>30</sup> Torrential rains fell during most of the march. The troops, subsisting on half rations of raw rice, burdened with shells and full combat equipment, had to use ropes to scale some of the cliffs near Mount Austen. They also used ropes to help manhandle the artillery pieces, machine guns, and mortars along the trail. As carrying and hauling the artillery pieces by man-power proved impossible, all the guns were abandoned along the line of march.<sup>31</sup>

#### PRELIMINARY ATTACKS—MATANIKAU AREA

The landing of the Japanese from transports on October 15 had convinced 1st Marine Division Headquarters that a major attack was impending. A captured map led headquarters to expect a three-pronged attack by three enemy divisions from the east, west, and south.<sup>32</sup> But there were no indications that fresh Japanese forces had landed east of the perimeter, and air and ground patrols had not found any organized bodies of Japanese troops along the upper Lunga, but only dispirited groups of hungry stragglers, most of whom were promptly killed. The increasing artillery fire and growing Japanese troop strength west of the Matanikau, on the other hand, convinced the Lunga

<sup>29</sup>XIV Corps, Enemy Opns, Misc Units, p. 8; translation, Feb 21, '43.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, Jul 14 '43.

<sup>31</sup>Interr of Hyakutake, Miyazaki, and Maruyama.

<sup>32</sup>1st Mar Div Rpt, V, 21.

<sup>28</sup>The exact trace of this trail is not now known.

defenders that the brunt of the attack would fall in that area.

Maruyama's troops, unknown to the Americans, were meanwhile slowly approaching the perimeter. Without good military maps, the Japanese commanders were meeting great difficulty in finding their way. When advance elements of the enveloping force failed to cross the upper Lunga before October 19, Maruyama postponed the assault date until October 22.<sup>33</sup>

The first ground action of the offensive occurred in the Matanikau area on October 20, when a Japanese combat patrol from Sumiyoshi's force, including two tanks, came east to the west bank of the river. When one of the 37-mm. guns in the sector of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, hit one tank, the patrol withdrew. At sunset the next night, following heavy Japanese artillery fire, nine Japanese tanks supported by infantry came out of the jungle on the west bank to drive east over the sandbar. When 37-mm. fire knocked out one tank the force pulled back to the west.

No Japanese infantrymen appeared on October 22, but Sumiyoshi's artillery kept firing. On October 22 Maruyama, still short of his line of departure, put off the attack date to October 23, and on that date he postponed it until October 24.

October 23 was quiet until about 1800, when Sumiyoshi's artillery fired its heaviest concentration up to that time—an orthodox preparation on the Matanikau River line, the rear areas, and the coast road. After the fire had ceased a column of nine 18-ton tanks appeared out of the jungle to try to smash a passage across the sandbar to get through the defenses of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, while the 4th Infantry assembled in the jungle west of the river. To halt the infantry, the 11th Marines immediately began

firing a series of barrages to cover a 600 to 800 yard-wide area between the river and Point Cruz,<sup>34</sup> while the 37-mm. guns on the Matanikau engaged the tanks. No enemy infantrymen succeeded in crossing to the east bank of the river. The antitank guns meanwhile wrecked eight tanks as they rumbled across the sandbar. One tank eluded the 37-mm. fire and crossed the sandbar safely to break through the wire entanglements. One marine rose out of his foxhole and threw a grenade into the tank's tracks. A 75-mm. selfpropelled tank destroyer then pulled up to fire at close range. The lone tank ran down the beach into the water, where it stalled, to be finished off by the tank destroyer. The Japanese assault having been stopped so abruptly, the surviving infantrymen withdrew. A second Japanese attempt to get across the river farther upstream was easily halted about midnight.

The jungles west of the river were filled with Japanese corpses, and many enemy dead lay on the sandbar, so effective had been the 11th Marines' fire. The 1st Marines, with 25 killed and 14 wounded, estimated Japanese losses at 600. Marine patrols later found three more wrecked tanks west of the river, apparently destroyed by the 11th Marines before they could reach the Matanikau.

Sumiyoshi had sent one tank company and one infantry regiment forward to attack a prepared position over an obvious approach route while the Americans were otherwise unengaged. The Maruyama force, still moving inland, had not yet reached its line of departure. The responsible commanders, in explaining this lack of coordination afterward, blamed each other. According to Hyakutake, this piecemeal attack had been a mistake. The coastal attack was to have been delivered at the same time that Maruyama's troops struck against the southern perimeter

<sup>33</sup>XIV Corps translation, Jul 14, '42.

<sup>34</sup>del Valle, "Marine Field Artillery on Guadalcanal," p. 730.



line. Maruyama was to have notified the 4th Infantry when he had reached his objective, but, confused, had thought he had reached his line of departure on October 23. When he notified the 4th Infantry to that effect, that regiment had proceeded with its attack.

Maruyama, disclaiming responsibility for the blunder, blamed 17th Army Headquarters. His forces, delayed in their approach march, had not reached their line of departure on October 23. But 17th Army Headquarters, over-estimating the rate of progress on the south flank, had ordered the coast forces to attack on October 23 to guarantee success on the south flank.

Sumiyoshi was vague, claiming that throughout the counter-offensive malaria had so weakened him that he had found it difficult to make decisions. After once stating that he did not know why the attack of October 23 had been ordered, he later asserted that he had attacked ahead of Maruyama to divert the Americans. Communication between the two forces, he claimed, had been very poor. Radio sets gave off too much light, so had been used only during the daylight hours. Telephone communication had been frequently disrupted. As a result the coast force had usually been one day behind in the knowledge of Maruyama's movements.<sup>35</sup>

#### THE 2d Division's ATTACKS

The day after Sumiyoshi's abortive attack (October 24), the Lunga perimeter was fairly quiet during the morning hours, although Japanese artillery fire continued intermittently throughout the day, killing six and wounding twenty-five marines. But in the afternoon two events indicated that the situation was extremely serious. Men of the 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, holding the southeast sector of the forward Matanikau position, observed a Japanese column passing eastward over Mount Austen's open foothills about 1,000 yards south of their lines. This column, the exact composition of which is doubtful, is reported to have been commanded by Col. Akinosuke Oka. It had apparently crossed the upper Matanikau in an effort to outflank the forward Matanikau position.<sup>36</sup> Battalions of the 11th Marines immediately put fire on the area, and attack aircraft rose to strafe and bomb it. But the column had disappeared among jungled ravines, and the effects of the bombing and shelling were probably slight.

As patrol reports had been indicating that the upper reaches of the Lunga River were clear of the enemy, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, had been withdrawn from Sector Three east of the Lunga on October 23, prior to the Sumiyoshi attack. The entire 2,800 yard front, from the Lunga River over Bloody Ridge to the right flank of the 164th Infantry, had been turned over to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2d Battalion, 7th, had been ordered to the Matanikau to relieve the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. This move and relief would have placed the Matanikau area under command of the 7th Marines Regimental Headquarters. But following the Sumiyoshi attack on October 23 and the observation of the enemy column the next afternoon, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, on October 24, moved hastily into position along the east ridges of the Hill 67 escarpment to hold the line between the left flank of the 3d Battalion, 7th, and the 5th Marines in the Lunga perimeter—over 4,000 yards of front.

<sup>36</sup>This movement was not directed by the original orders. According to the 1st Demob Bur's map, the column consisted of 1,200 troops of the 124th Inf (less 3d Bn) and the 3d Bn, 4th Inf.

<sup>35</sup>Interr of Hyakutake, Miyazaki, and Maruyama; interr of Sumiyoshi, Sept 17, '46.

Following the discovery of Oka's column east of the Macanikau came evidence that another sector was in danger. A straggler from a 7th Marines patrol returned to the perimeter in the late afternoon to report that he had seen a Japanese officer studying Bloody Ridge through field glasses. At the same time a marine from the Division Scout-Sniper Detachment reported that he had seen the smoke of "many rice fires" rising from the jungle near the horse-shoe bend of the Lunga River, about one and three-fourths miles south of the southern slopes of Bloody Ridge.<sup>27</sup> But it was too late in the day for further defensive measures. Lt. Col. Lewis B. Puller's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, spread thinly over its long front, awaited the attack. There were then few troops available for further commitment. The motorized division reserve, bivouacked north at Henderson Field, consisted of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The only other uncommitted troops in the perimeter were the reserve battalions in each regimental sector.

Maruyama's complete infantry forces had finally crossed the Lunga River and moved into position in the dark jungles east of the river and south of Bloody Ridge. On the left (west) the 20th Infantry, supported by the 10th, prepared to attack on a narrow front, while Kawaguchi's wing prepared to attack farther east.<sup>28</sup> But by October 24 all the artillery pieces and mortars had been abandoned. The heaviest weapons for supporting the infantry were machine guns. Maruyama had hoped that bright moonlight would provide enough light for his assault troops to maintain their direction, but clouds and heavy rainfall made the night pitch-black.

<sup>27</sup> *The War Di. Rpt.*, V, 25.

<sup>28</sup> According to Suminashi and Tamaki, Kawaguchi had advanced attacking from the southeast. He had earlier run with no supervision and been replaced by Col. Tetsuharu Shoji. Headquarters, Miyazaki, and Maruyama made no mention of this incident.

The early evening hours were quiet. One marine listening post east of Bloody Ridge briefly opened fire about 2130, then subsided. The front lay quiet for over ninety minutes. Then, at 0030, October 25, Japanese infantrymen, firing rifles, throwing grenades, and shouting their battle cries, suddenly sprang out of the jungle to try to cross the fields of fire on the left center of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, just east of Bloody Ridge. This was the 20th Infantry's assault, the only attack delivered by the Japanese that night. Kawaguchi's wing, in attempting to reach the perimeter in the black rainy night, had lost direction and gotten in behind the 20th Infantry. The confused battalions were immediately ordered back to the front but arrived too late to participate in that night's action.

The 20th Infantry overran some of the American positions in the first few wild minutes of battle. One platoon captured two mortar positions but was immediately destroyed by Colonel Puller's forces. As in previous engagements the Japanese charges, which had driven close to the American lines, were broken by fire from small arms and heavy weapons. At the first attack the 11th Marines had begun firing barrages in depth in front of the threatened sector, and this fire was maintained throughout the night. But the one marine infantry battalion was holding a long front against heavy odds, and although the Japanese infantry was unable to break through, some individuals and small groups succeeded in infiltrating to the battalion's rear.

When the 20th Infantry first attacked, two platoons from G Company and one platoon from E Company of the 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry had assisted the threatened battalion by fire.<sup>29</sup> At the same time 1st Marine Division Headquarters had ordered the 3d Bat-

<sup>29</sup> Winter, author with Capt. Harry C. Schick, *Former Adj.*, 164th Inf., Mar. 15, '46.



ration. 164th Infantry, then in reserve in the 164th Infantry's sector, to proceed to the perimeter to reinforce the 1st Battalion. 7th Marines, by detachments.<sup>40</sup> This army battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert K. Hall, was then in bivouac south of Henderson Field about one mile from the front lines. The rain was still falling heavily, and visibility was poor. By 0200 the assembled battalion, about to engage the Japanese infantry for the first time, had left its bivouac area. While the marine battalion continued to hold back the Japanese, the soldiers entered the line by detachments between 0230 and 0330. The night was so dark that the marines guided them into position practically by hand. The two battalions, as disposed that night, did not defend separate sectors, but were intermingled along the front.

The Japanese continued to attack with characteristic resolution all through the night, but every charge was beaten back by the heavy American fire. Besides the marine heavy weapons and artillery, the weapons of M Company, 3d Battalion, one heavy machine-gun section of H Company, 2d Battalion, and 57-mm. antitank guns of the 164th Infantry supported the infantry. M Company fired 1,200 81-mm. mortar rounds that night.<sup>41</sup> The line beat back a series of separate infantry assaults. It never broke or retreated, although some Japanese, including Col. Masa-iro Furumura of the 24th Infantry, got through to the heavy jungle behind the American lines.<sup>42</sup> By 0700, October 25, the Japanese attacks had ceased temporarily as Moriyama withdrew his battalions to regroup and prepare for another attack. The 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, had, in General Vandegrift's words, "... arrived in time

to prevent a serious penetration of the position and by reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines throughout its sector, made possible the repulse of continued enemy attacks."<sup>43</sup>

The front lines lay quiet throughout the daylight hours of Sunday, October 25. Japanese artillery and aircraft were so active, however, that veterans of Guadalcanal have named the day "Dugout Sunday." Pistol Pete opened fire at 0800, firing for three hours at ten-minute intervals. Strong enemy naval forces, engaged the next day in the battle of Santa Cruz, were known to be approaching, and the early hours of Dugout Sunday had found all Guadalcanal aircraft grounded. Fighter Strip No. 1, without marring or natural drainage, had been turned into a sticky bog by the heavy rains. Japanese planes bombed and strafed the Lunga delta in seven separate attacks.

Some Japanese pilots resolutely dive-bombed a group of planes parked in regular formation along the edge of Henderson Field, and destroyed a considerable number. These conspicuous targets, however, were non-flying trucks from the "homeward" unit in the open to deceive the enemy. The operational aircraft had been camouflaged and dispersed.<sup>44</sup>

During the morning three Japanese destroyers, having entered Seizark Channel from the north, caught two World War I, flush-deck, American destroyer-transport off Kakum. The latter vessels, outgunned, escaped to the east. The Japanese ships then opened fire on two of the harbor patrol boats from Tulagi, set them afire, and ventured within range of the 3d Defense Battalion's 5-inch batteries on the beach, which hit the leading destroyer three times. The enemy

<sup>40</sup>1st Mar Div Rpt. V, 24; 164th Inf Rpt., Oct. 25, '42.

<sup>41</sup>Lt. Col. Samuel Baglin (former EnO, 164th Inf).

"The Second Battle for Henderson Field," *Infantry Journal*, LIX, 4 (Mar. '44), 8.

<sup>42</sup>See extracts from Furumura's diary in 1st Div Rpt. V, Annex I.

<sup>43</sup>1st Mar Div Bull. No. 64-42, attached to 164th Inf Opn Rpt., Oct. 24-31, '42, in USAFISPA G-3 Periodic Rpt.

<sup>44</sup>1st Mar Div Rpt. V, 24-25.

ships then pulled out of range. By then the sun had dried the airfield slightly, and three fighters succeeded in taking off to strafe the destroyers, which then escaped to the north.

As the runways became drier more and more American planes were able to get into the air to challenge the Japanese overhead, until by evening they had shot down twenty-two planes in addition to five destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.

Along the perimeter, the Americans reorganized their lines. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, intermingled during the night, divided the front between them. The marine battalion occupied the sector from the Lunga River to a point about 1,400 yards to the east, covering the south slopes of Bloody Ridge. The army battalion took over the sector in low-lying, rough jungle between the marines left (east) flank and the right flank of the 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 164th, prepared to defend its sector with three companies in line—L on the left, K in the center, and I on the right. Sixty-mm. mortars were emplaced behind the lines to put fire directly in front of the barbed wire; 81-mm. mortars, behind the light mortars, were to hit the edge of the jungle beyond the cleared fields of fire, which varied in depth from 60 to 100 yards. Four 37-mm. guns covered the junction of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 164th Infantry, where a narrow trail led north to the Lunga road net. The 164th Infantry regimental reserve, consisting of 175 men of the Service and Antitank Companies, bivouacked in the 3d Battalion's old position.<sup>45</sup> To the west in Sector Five, the 5th Marines swung their line southwestward to close with the left flank of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. During the day the soldiers and marines, besides

strengthening their positions, improving fields of fire, cleaning and siting their weapons, hunted down and killed sixty-seven of the Japanese who had penetrated the perimeter during the night.

Hidden in the jungle south of the perimeter, Maruyama was preparing to attack again. Acting on the false report that an American force was approaching his right (east) flank, he had deployed Kawaguchi's wing to meet the threat. The attack against the perimeter was to be delivered by two infantry regiments in line—the 16th on the right and the 29th on the left.<sup>46</sup>

After the fall of darkness on Dugout Sunday, Maruyama's troops struck again, following the same pattern as on the previous night. The 16th and 29th Infantry Regiments attacked all along the fronts of the two American battalions which had defeated the 29th Infantry the night before. Supported by machine-gun fire, groups varying in size from 30 to 200 soldiers assaulted the perimeter in the darkness. They executed one strong attack against the point of contact of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 164th Infantry where the trail led northward. Two enemy machine-gun companies covered by riflemen repeatedly drove in toward the trail,<sup>47</sup> but were killed or driven off by canister from the 37-mm. guns and by weapons of the 3d and 2d Battalions. About 250 Japanese were killed in the attempt to get possession of the trail. One company of the division reserve went forward to support L Company of the 164th, and one platoon of G Company, 164th, moved south to support L Company and E Company, on L's left. The 164th regimental reserve was alerted in the event of a breakthrough, but again the lines held. The 16th and 29th Regiments pressed their attacks until daylight, but every one was again

<sup>45</sup>Baglien, "The Second Battle for Henderson Field," p. 25.

<sup>46</sup>Inter of Hyakutake, Miyazaki, and Maruyama.

<sup>47</sup>164th Inf Rpt Action Against the Enemy, pp. 1-2.



beaten back. At daylight, October 26, the shattered Japanese forces again withdrew into the cover of the jungle. Hyakutake's main effort had failed.

Elsewhere during the night of October 25-26 the enemy had struck with slightly greater immediate success. Oka's force, which had been observed crossing Mount Austen's foothills the day before, attacked southward against the attenuated lines of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, along the escarpment eastward from Hill 67. The Japanese broke through at one point, but before they could consolidate their positions Maj. Odell M. Conoley, a marine staff officer, hastily contrived a counterattack with headquarters personnel, special weapons troops, handsmen, and one platoon of the 1st Marines, which drove the Japanese off the ridge.<sup>48</sup>

The unsuccessful night attacks of October 25-26 marked the end of the ground phase of the October counter-offensive. The Japanese forces began a general withdrawal about October 29. There were no more infantry assaults. American patrols, meeting only sniping riflemen, small patrols, and bands of stragglers, were able to advance 2,500 yards south of the perimeter. The enemy force, defeated, was retreating eastward and westward—to Koli Point and to Kokumbona.

The soldiers of the 164th Infantry had done well in their first action. General Vandegrift expressed his approval: "The 1st Division is proud to have serving with it another unit which has stood the test of battle and demonstrated an overwhelming superiority over the enemy."<sup>49</sup>

The Japanese counter-offensive, entered into with such high hopes, had been a costly failure. The 1st Marine Division conserva-

tively reported that some 2,200 Japanese soldiers had been killed. XIV Corps gave a larger estimate of enemy losses—3,568 casualties in the 16th and 29th Regiments alone. By November, the effective strength of the 4th Infantry numbered only 403. Over 1,500 stinking Japanese corpses lay in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry.<sup>50</sup> The latter regiment reported that it had completed the nauseous task of burying 975 enemy bodies in front of K and L Companies. Among the dead Japanese were General Nasu and Colonels Furumiya and Toshiro Hiroyasu (CO, 16th Infantry). American losses had been light by comparison. The 164th Infantry lost twenty-six men killed and fifty-two wounded throughout October.

The bombardment of the Lunga airfields had been by far the most successful phase of the Japanese attack. The infantry assaults, usually delivered against battalions by forces in regimental strength, had failed completely. Japanese coordination, as exemplified by the operations of Sumivoshi and Maruyama, had been poor, and the assaults had been delivered in piecemeal fashion. If Oka's attack had been intended to divert the Americans, it came forty-eight hours too late to be effective. The fact that Maruyama was able to move his troops around Mount Austen in secret was a signal demonstration of the skill and doggedness of the Japanese soldier, but the terrain over which the intended envelopment had been executed prevented the transport of artillery. Maruyama's night attacks had thus been made by unsupported infantry against prepared positions supported by artillery and heavy weapons. As the circular perimeter line had no open flanks, the Japanese attacks had been frontal assaults. The Lunga airfields, though seriously threatened,

<sup>48</sup>Hist Sect, Hq. U. S. Marine Corps, *The Guadalcanal Campaign* (June 45), p. 80; 1st Mar Div Rpt. V, Annex O (1st Mar Reg Hist), 2.

<sup>49</sup>1st Mar Div Bull. No. 64a-42.

<sup>50</sup>1st Mar Div Rpt. V, Int Annex N, 10.

had been saved by a combination of Japanese recklessness and American skill and bravery.

#### THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ

The naval phase of the October counter-offensive was concluded almost anticlimactically by the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 26 by South Pacific naval forces, which as shown above, had been preparing since early October. On October 20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington transferred submarines of the Southwest Pacific naval forces to the South Pacific, and Admiral Nimitz promised to send more submarines from the Pacific Fleet for duty in the South Pacific. Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., who became the South Pacific Area commander on October 18, ordered the Southwest Pacific submarine force to cover Faisi, Rabaul, Buka, northern New Georgia, Kavieng, Bougainville Strait, and Indispensable Strait to attack warships, tankers, transports, and supply ships.<sup>51</sup> The *Enterprise* and her escorts rendezvoused with the *Hornet* task group northeast of the New Hebrides on October 24. The task force thus assembled, commanded by Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, consisted of two carrier groups—the *Enterprise*, *South Dakota*, one heavy cruiser, one light antiaircraft cruiser, and eight destroyers, and the *Hornet* with two heavy and two light antiaircraft cruisers and six destroyers.

A strong Japanese fleet, consisting of four carriers, four battleships, eight cruisers, one light cruiser, twenty-eight destroyers, four oilers, and three cargo ships,<sup>52</sup> had meanwhile been maneuvering off the Santa Cruz Islands

in support of the 17th Army. At 0110, October 26, while 17th Army forces were attacking the Lunga delta, patrolling planes from Admiral Kinkaid's force discovered part of the enemy fleet near the Santa Cruz Islands. The ensuing engagement, a series of aircraft attacks against other aircraft and surface ships, proved less decisive than the ground operations on Guadalcanal. The outnumbered American force lost twenty planes to enemy action and fifty-four by operational crashes. The *Hornet* and the destroyer *Porter* were sunk, and the *Enterprise*, the *South Dakota*, and the light anti-aircraft cruiser *San Juan* and the destroyer *Smith* suffered damage. All the enemy ships remained afloat, but three carriers and two destroyers were damaged. The Japanese lost 100 planes, a blow which may have limited the amount of air cover they were able to give their convoys in November.<sup>53</sup> At the conclusion of the day's action the Japanese fleet withdrew and returned to Truk,<sup>54</sup> not because it had been defeated but because the 17th Army had failed.<sup>55</sup> The Santa Cruz engagement proved to be the last action of the Guadalcanal campaign in which the Japanese committed aircraft carriers.

One major crisis in the progress of the first Allied counter-offensive in the Pacific had been averted. The Americans on Guadalcanal had won a significant victory. The Japanese were to threaten Henderson Field again, but never to the same extent as during the grim days in October. The American marines and soldiers, confronted by a skillful foe noted for his desperate courage, had demonstrated clearly that they could defend a vitally important position both resolutely and effectively.

<sup>51</sup> SOPAC War Diary: COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, 0736 (Z time) of Oct 20, '42; CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, 2215 of Oct 20, '42; COMSOPAC to CTF 42, 0232 of Oct 24, '42.

<sup>52</sup> *Campaigns of the Pacific War*, Appendix 44, p. 123.

<sup>53</sup> *Interrogations*, II, 42.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 79.

<sup>55</sup> See Battle of Santa Cruz, p. 58.



# ESTABLISHING THE BOLERO FERRY ROUTE

By SAMUEL MILNER\*

The Bolero plan, formulated in the early spring of 1942, called for the dispatch of an American expeditionary force, including ground and air forces, to the United Kingdom for operations against enemy-held Western Europe.<sup>1</sup> An essential factor in the rapid build-up of American air strength in the United Kingdom, as envisaged in the plan, was the establishment, during the spring and summer of 1942, of a ferry route from Labrador to the United Kingdom, via points in Greenland and Iceland, which made possible the ferrying of short range planes, including pursuits, over the North Atlantic. The successful establishment of this route which spanned almost 3,000 miles of ocean and lay over terrain as dangerous and weather as foul as any to be found in the world, constituted one of the great logistical achievements of World War II and contributed substantially to the success of Allied operations.

## PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENTS

Following the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, the Army Air Forces began to plan for a northeasterly, great circle ferry route to Great Britain. Although the strengthening of continental defense was a consideration, the project was primarily thought to be a means by which more effective aid could be rendered to the British who were then standing alone in the fight against Germany. The 2,100 mile non-stop route from Gander, Newfoundland, directly across the Atlantic to Prestwick, Scotland, then used for ferrying by the British and Canadians,

had serious shortcomings. It was plagued by extremely bad weather, and was suitable only for the ferrying of heavier types of bombers. A great circle route farther to the North via Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland, was believed to enjoy better weather, and would make possible the ferrying of lighter planes.<sup>2</sup>


The advantages of being able to ferry short range planes to England were manifest. Pressure on shipping would be relieved. The planes would no longer be liable to loss by submarine action; there would be no need to disassemble and crate them at the factories and reassemble them in England. They could be delivered and be in combat in a matter of days when, otherwise, their transfer and reassembly would take months. Large reassembly depots in England would become unnecessary.

The weather along the great circle route was better than that along the direct route; much better, for instance, in Labrador than in Newfoundland. Fog, icing, and turbulence, the great hazards to flight over the North Atlantic, were less; and with proper weather and communications service and effective radio navigational aids, it was a route which could be made safe for heavy air traffic. The British already controlled the airfields in Iceland; they had good terminal facilities at Prestwick, Scotland, and, as an alternate to Prestwick, a landing field at

<sup>2</sup>Memo Capt. T. N. Charles, AWPd, for Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Mar 13, 1941, sub: General Conditions Bearing Upon the Feasibility of Establishing Airdromes at Distances Suitable for the Ferrying of Short Range Airplanes to England, in AAG 686, Airdromes: memo Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Actg DC/S for C/S, Apr 13, 1941, sub: Ferrying of Aircraft to England, in AAG 381, Greenland; *Atlantic Bridge: The Official Account of the RAF Transport Command's Ocean Ferry* (London, 1945), *passim*.

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<sup>1</sup>Combined Directive for the Preparation of War Plan—BOLERO . . . , Apr. 28, 1941, in OPD Files.



Bolero ferry route

Stornoway in the Hebrides. The Canadians were planning for a base in Labrador. The great problem was Greenland.<sup>3</sup>

The Danish-American Agreement of April 1941 for the common defense of Greenland and the North American continent made it possible for the United States to begin to

build air bases in Greenland. Surveys of the Greenland area were ordered at once by the Army Air Forces. No site for an airfield could be found on the east coast, but the survey parties found two good sites elsewhere on the island. The first, given the code name of Bluie West 1 (BW-1), was at Narsarsuaq, near the southern tip of the island, about thirty-five statute miles northeast of Julienhaab. The second, named Bluie West

<sup>3</sup>NOLD, *History of the North Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command*, 1: 86, 108, 113-114, 397-400; *Atlantic Bridge*, pp. 27-29.



8 (BW-8), was at Sondrestromfjord, near Holsteinborg, on the northwest coast.<sup>4</sup>

In July 1941, the United States sent its first troops to Greenland and Iceland, and the Canadians discovered an excellent site for an airfield in Labrador at Goose Bay, on Northwest River.<sup>5</sup> With appropriate fields in northeastern United States, the elements of the route were in hand.

The distances between these points are relatively short. BW-1, 495 statute miles from BW-8, lies roughly midway between Goose Bay and Reykjavik, Iceland, 777 miles from Goose Bay and 770 from Reykjavik. Goose Bay is 949 miles from BW-8, and BW-8 is 845 miles from Reykjavik. The distance from Reykjavik to Stornoway is 659 miles, to Prestwick, 844 miles. There could be little doubt, therefore, as to the feasibility of the route for short-range ferrying.

In late May 1941, while the survey parties were still in the field, a new Army Air Forces organization, the Air Corps Ferrying Command was established, under command of Col. Robert Olds. The new command was assigned as one of its main tasks the delivery of aircraft from the factories to transfer points at Presque Isle and Houlton, Maine, and Dorval Airport, Montreal, where they were turned over to the British and Canadians for flight delivery to the United Kingdom over the non-stop route. In addition to other transport services, the Ferrying Command began to provide a long-range North At-

lantic service between Bolling Field, Washington, D. C., and Prestwick. Colonel Olds was a strong proponent of the short range route; and saw it as a means whereby his command would be able to deliver lend-lease aircraft directly to Britain, rather than merely to transfer points in North America.<sup>6</sup>

Work on a landing field at BW-1 had begun in early July 1941. In September, the Greenland and Iceland base commands were established; the former under command of Col. Benjamin F. Giles, the latter, under that of Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel. Construction began at BW-8; the Canadians began building the airfield at Goose Bay;<sup>7</sup> and, closely tied in with the building of the landing fields, the Army Air Forces ordered weather and communications detachments to points in Labrador, Baffin Island; and Greenland. The stations in Labrador and Baffin Island, three in number and known as the Crystal stations, were admirably situated for the observation of Arctic weather movements that swept over the route. Crystal I was at Fort Chimo, in northeastern Quebec; Crystal II was at the upper end of Frobisher Bay in southern Baffin Island; Crystal III, on Padloping Island, was just off the northeast coast of Baffin Island. The other air force detachments were sent to BW-1, BW-8, and Bluie East 2 (BE-2), near Angmagssalik in northeastern Greenland. Described as "the initial action in the establishment of an alternative route for the ferrying of aircraft from the United States to the United Kingdom,"

<sup>4</sup>Memo C/S for CNO, May 2, 1941, in AAG 381, Greenland; Report of South Greenland Expedition, 17 March 5 June 1941, in AAG 600.93, Greenland; memo Secy. A/S for C/S, July 25, 1941, in AAG 600, Greenland; North Atlantic Division History, I: 103-104; U. S. Dept. of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, (Washington, 1943), pp. 103-104, 640-648. A site on the east coast was finally discovered in the summer of 1942. The air-strip, completed in the fall, was used as an emergency landing field.

<sup>5</sup>TC, Transportation of U. S. Forces in the Occupation of Iceland, p. 1; North Atlantic Division History, I: 72.

<sup>6</sup>Memo Col. Robert Olds for C/AAF, July 27, 1941, sub: Development of North Atlantic Alternate Route from the United States to the United Kingdom; memo Col. Olds for C/AC, Nov 24, 1941, sub: Extension of the Air Corps Ferrying Command Operations to include Flight Deliveries to the United Kingdom; in ATC Historical File; ATC, Administrative History of the Ferrying Command, 29 May 1941-20 June 1942, pp. 9-10, 12; North Atlantic Division History, I: 9, 46.

<sup>7</sup>CE, Army Bases, Greenland, I: Sec 6, p. 1; North Atlantic Division History, I: 86, 103; Transportation U. S. Forces, Iceland, p. 53.

these detachments, a bare and inadequate beginning upon what would be needed to make the route operative, arrived at their posts of duty in early December.<sup>8</sup> With the Ferrying Command services at Presque Isle and Houlton, Canadian facilities at Goose Bay, Danish weather stations in Greenland (which were soon absorbed by the AAF), and British services at Reykjavik, Stornoway and Prestwick, the route had the essentials of a communications and weather network.

By December 7, the bases at Presque Isle and Houlton were nearly complete; but only a temporary runway of gravel and compacted snow had been completed at Goose Bay. In Greenland, the base command was still busy with construction of the bases at BW-1 and BW-8, and, in Iceland, General Bonesteel's command had begun surveys for two fields in the Keflavik area. Meanwhile, the American air units defending Iceland had to share with the British the small and crowded base at Reykjavik.<sup>9</sup>

#### ESTABLISHING THE AIRWAY

The outbreak of hostilities with Germany on December 11, 1941 made it a certainty that American air-force concentrations would be sent to the British Isles. This gave new urgency to the whole short-range ferry project. To help speed construction at Goose Bay, the Ferrying Command furnished the Canadians with a C-39 (Douglas, "DC2½") transport service which operated throughout the winter out of Moncton, New Brunswick. Despite extremely unfavorable weather some work went on as well in Greenland and Iceland.<sup>10</sup> In the spring, orders were issued for

the establishment of the route.

On March 26, 1942, General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, ordered the Ferrying Command to establish as a special project "ferry service for light bombardment and pursuit from [Labrador] to Greenland to Iceland to Scotland." The command was to devise ways and means of establishing the route at the earliest possible moment. Actual ferrying was to begin "not later than July 1st."<sup>11</sup>

This route, when established, was to be the Bolero air route, and over it the Eighth Air Force, chosen soon thereafter to be the Bolero Air Force, would fly the greater portion of its aircraft to England. The task of establishing such a route within the time prescribed was staggering. Most of the bases were still under construction; existing weather and communications facilities were insufficient for safe operation; and, except for Presque Isle and Prestwick, not one was equipped or manned to handle large scale ferrying movements. The problem of integrating the Canadian and British bases into the operation had still to be solved. Construction and supply in the Arctic and sub-Arctic areas in which the intermediate bases were to be found presented unusual difficulties. Each base had its own problems which required individual solution.

Goose Bay was accessible by water only in the summer and autumn, and permanent runway construction had to be held over until the spring thaw set in. Heavy supplies would thus have to be brought in, and major construction completed in a very short period of time.<sup>12</sup>

Greenland's priority on shipping was low. Ivigtut, near Julienhaab, was its only all-weather port; all the rest were ice-locked from

<sup>8</sup>Memo Gen. Spaatz, C/AS for AWPB, Aug 26, 1941, sub: Aviation Facilities, North Atlantic Air Route; memo Secy. A/S for C/S, Sept 23, 1941, sub: Additional Facilities, North Atlantic Air Route, in AAG 361 A, Air Routes; North Atlantic Division History, I: 132-133.

<sup>9</sup>North Atlantic Division History, I: 82, 88, 103-104, 108-109.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.* I: 22, 87, 103-104, 290.

<sup>11</sup>R&R Gen. Arnold to CG ACFC, Mar 26, 1942, sub: Special Project of Establishing Ferry Service Route, in Mosley File, ATC Central Files.

<sup>12</sup>North Atlantic Division History, I: 88, 569.



late September until May and had no facilities for unloading large ships. There were neither coastal nor inland roads in Greenland, and no resources for support of an occupying force. High winds and dangerous ice-formations offshore and in the fjords caused great loss in the unloading and transport of supplies. Eight craft, barges, tugs, and launches, with all on board, were lost during the construction period. The strong winds, low temperatures, heavy snowfall, deep penetration of the ground by frost, as well as torrential rains and mud, complicated construction and caused it to lag noticeably.<sup>13</sup>

In Iceland, conditions were more favorable. Iceland had a number of all-weather ports and good coastal roads. The Icelanders had developed a large fishing industry and did considerable farming and dairying. Because of the possibility of a German invasion from Norway, Iceland enjoyed a relatively high priority on shipping. The difficulty was chiefly one of securing sufficient runway space. The runways at Reykjavik were, for the most part, short and could not be lengthened; and the difficult terrain and high winds in the Keflavik area made construction of the fields there a slow and plodding business.<sup>14</sup>

With the coming of spring, base construction activities were accelerated all along the route. During the spring and summer, heavy supplies and equipment, including oil and gasoline required by the movement, were sent by sea to all of the bases and to the Crystal stations. While the base commands at Greenland and Iceland were speeding construction, the regional communications service was installing and adjusting new equipment; the

regional weather service was establishing new stations and breaking in personnel; the Air Service Command was procuring and storing supplies for the movement. The Ferrying Command had the task of coordinating the development of the route, and, with the aid of civil contract carriers, who had taken over its earlier military transport operations, provided needed air transport for movement to the bases of high priority personnel and materiel.<sup>15</sup>

Brig. Gen. Harold L. George, who had just become head of the Ferrying Command, assigned immediate responsibility for organization of the route to Lt. Col. Milton W. Arnold, a key Ferrying Command operations officer, and a small staff who knew the North Atlantic. In early April, Colonel Arnold surveyed the route to determine its adequacy for ferrying purposes, particularly for pursuit planes. Upon his return to Washington late in the month, he pointed out serious deficiencies in the weather and communications services. He observed, also, that at every base along the route "personnel was inadequate and radio navigational aids were inadequate." He felt that cooperation between American stations and the Canadian and British weather and communications services at Goose Bay and Reykjavik was very poor. Cooperation among the various American agencies at the staging points was little better. The route, however, was entirely suitable for the ferrying of pursuit

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, I: 102; U. S. Army Bases, Greenland, I: sec 6, pp. 7, 8; Transportation U. S. Forces, Iceland, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>14</sup>North Atlantic Division History, I: 108, 111; Transportation U. S. Forces, Iceland, pp. 2, 12, 53, 64.

<sup>15</sup>R&R AFAEP for AFDMR, Apr 24, 1942, sub: Ferry Plan "Bolero"; memo Lt. Col. Milton W. Arnold *et al* for CG FC, May 1, 1942, sub: Report of Survey Flight—Northeast Ferry Route, in Bolero File, AAF Archives; memo CG AAF for CG FC *et al*, May 17, 1942, sub: Responsibilities for Air Echelon—Bolero Movement, in ATC Historical File. These contract carriers were: Northeast Airlines and Transcontinental and Western Air. American Airlines, also operating over the route, was then under contract to the Air Service Command. In late June 1942, the contract was taken over by the Air Transport Command, the Ferrying Command's successor. See ATC, Ferrying Command Operations, December 7, 1941-June 30, 1942, pp. 192-194, 207, 215, 217.

planes, the best Bolero route running from Presque Isle to Goose Bay, with flight to either BW-1 or BW-8 depending upon the weather.<sup>16</sup>

By late April 1942, the Eighth Air Force was already preparing to move its advance units into concentration areas in New England for final training for overseas flight. On May 2, at a joint meeting of the Air Staff, the Ferrying Command, the Eighth Air Force, and other interested agencies, the route recommended by Colonel Arnold—Presque Isle, Goose Bay, BW-1 or BW-8, Reykjavik and Prestwick—was agreed upon. It was also agreed that single B-17's should lead four pursuits.<sup>17</sup>

In mid-May, the active assistance of the Canadians and British in expediting the movement was secured. By that time, the Ferrying Command had been given the responsibility for the operation of all essential base functions needful to the movement and, more particularly, was to provide the route with control officers and operations personnel. The Eighth Air Force, on the other hand, was to organize an independent control system "for the direction of all ferrying operations involved in the initial movement." Brig. Gen. Frank O'D. Hunter, Commanding General of the VIII Fighter Command, who had previously been named commander of

the first Bolero movement, thus acquired full operational control over it.<sup>18</sup>

The Ferrying Command objected strongly to this arrangement, and recommended that its own seasoned flight crews be permitted to lead the movement, and, also, that its experienced operations personnel take over full control of route operations. Colonel Arnold, and the other Ferrying Command officers associated with him in the organization of the route, felt, moreover, that it was an injustice to saddle the Command with responsibility for the successful conduct of the route and, at the same time, give it no authority over the weather and communications services—the very heart of the operation. Accordingly, on June 3, General George, who had been seeking a decision on the matter, pointed out to General Arnold that the success of the Bolero ferrying project required that "complete control of the entire route . . . be vested in one officer empowered to take, on the spot, all necessary action to insure that all facilities along the route function efficiently." He urged that a North Atlantic wing of the Ferrying Command be established to take over complete control of the route; and recommended that Col. Benjamin F. Giles, head of the Greenland Base Command, be made its commander. General Arnold agreed with General George's recommendations, except that the VIII Fighter Command was permitted to retain control over the first Bolero movement. On June 8, Colonel Giles assumed command of the North Atlantic Wing, and the regional commanders of the North Atlantic weather and communications serv-

<sup>16</sup>Memo Col. Arnold *et al* for CG FC, May 1, 1942, sub: Report of Survey Flight—Northeast Ferry Route; ltr Col. Arnold to CG ATC, Aug 6, 1943, sub: Report of Development of the North Atlantic Wing, March 1942-August 1942, in Dpty Comdr's File, ATC Central Files. The safe operating range of the P-38F with belly-tanks was figured as 1500 miles. See incl. to "Plan to Ferry One Group P-38's," [ca. May 15, 1942], in Bolero File, AAF Archives.

<sup>17</sup>Memo Col. H. A. Craig, AC/AS Plans, for AC/S OPD, Apr 25, 1942, sub: Composition of Initial Air Echelon for the United Kingdom, in Bolero File, AAF Archives; Report of Committee to Take Necessary Action for the Bolero Movement, May 1, 1942, in ATC Historical File.

<sup>18</sup>Ltr Gen. Spaatz to CG VIII Fighter Comd, May 7, 1942, sub: Responsibility for Movement of Aircraft to Bolero; memo Lt. Col. James J. Flynn, Jr., *et al* for CG FC, May 14, 1942, sub: Preliminary Report on Conference Held at Montreal on May 12, and at Ottawa on May 13; memo Col. Charles A. Hoek, Actg. Dir., WO&M, for CG FC *et al*, May 17, 1942, sub: Responsibilities for Air Echelon—Bolero Movement; in ATC Historical File.



ices were assigned to his staff the same day.<sup>19</sup>

Construction of the landing fields was well advanced by the time the first Bolero planes were ready to move. Although there were, as yet, not enough parking areas, there were sufficient runways. Goose Bay had a 6,000 foot runway ready for use; BW-1 and BW-8 each had one 5,000 feet in length. The fields at Keflavik were still under construction, but Reykjavik had three fields ready for the movement, two of them, however, suitable only for pursuits. All the staging points had adequate stores of oil and gasoline, but their communications, radio range and direction-finding equipment were only barely adequate, and not all were in full operation. Although the Americans at Goose Bay and Reykjavik had their own areas separate from those of the Canadians and the British, transient facilities there and at the Greenland bases were extremely limited. The number of personnel along the route was inadequate, and many essential base facilities were lacking. Ferrying Command contract carriers and C-47 troop carrier planes of the Eighth Air Force (which were to be part of the first movement) were flying in personnel and materiel with all speed, but it was clear that, despite their efforts and those of the personnel on the ground, the route would not be completely ready when the movement began.<sup>20</sup>

Search and rescue, a joint responsibility of the U. S. Navy and the Ferrying Command,

were already well organized. Flying boats (PBY's) were standing by at Goose Bay, BW-1, BW-8 and Reykjavik. There were dog teams and drivers at BW-1, BW-8 and BE-2. Ski-equipped Norseman planes were to be found at BW-8. In Denmark Strait and in Davis Strait, to the east and west of Greenland, and in the fjords leading to BW-1 and BW-8 were Coast Guard cutters to act as navigation markers.<sup>21</sup>

Each base had two sets of control officers: a Ferrying Command officer in charge of base facilities and routine flight control activities, and an Eighth Air Force control officer who was to direct the actual movement. The Ferrying Command control officers were, for the most part, former airlines pilots and executives who had had long experience in flight operations and had familiarized themselves with the route and with North Atlantic flying problems. With regard to the initial Bolero movement, however, they were to act "in an advisory capacity only."<sup>22</sup>

### THE FIRST BOLERO MOVEMENT

Although there were still difficulties to be ironed out all along the route, Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force, wired General Hunter on June 15 that the first Bolero planes were to begin to move on or about June 22. On June 18, the VIII Fighter Command, then at Grenier Field, New Hampshire, issued operations orders directing the overseas movement of the first element of the Bolero air echelon. As subsequently revised, the movement

<sup>19</sup>Memo Col. Arnold *et al* for CG FC, May 1, 1942, sub: Report of Survey Flight—Northeast Ferry Route; Memo Gen. George for CG AAF, June 3, 1942, sub: Report of Inspection Trip to Determine Adequacy of Bolero Facilities and Air Route, in 600, ATC Central Files; Ltr CG AAF to CG FC, June 3, 1942, sub: Functions of Air Force Ferrying Command—North Atlantic Wing, in 321.9, ATC Central Files. R&R Gen. George for AFACT, Sept 18, 1942, in ATC Historical File.

<sup>20</sup>Diary, VIII Fighter Comd, May 25, 1942, in Bolero File, AAF Archives; Ltr Col. C. R. Storrle to CO NAW, June 18, 1942; North Atlantic Ferry Route, Revised Construction Program, June 23, 1942; Ltr Col. Storrle to CO NAW, July 7, 1942; in ATC Historical File; North Atlantic Division History, I: 90-91, 103, 104, 108, 111, 113, 323, 539.

<sup>21</sup>Ltr AC/AS Plans to CG Greenland Base Comd, May 2, 1942, sub: Movement of Air Units to England; Diary, VIII Fighter Comd, May 15, 1942; rad unnumbered, COMTASKFOR 24 [no addressee] May 25, 1942; in Bolero File, AAF Archives.

<sup>22</sup>Memo Col. C. R. Smith, Exec Off FC for CG 23d AAF Ferrying Wg, June 19, 1942, sub: Operational Policies Initial Bolero Movement, in 600.12, ATC Central Files; North Atlantic Division History, I: 204.



P-38 and B-17 forced down on the Greenland ice cap while being ferried over the Bolero route

included the forty-nine B-17E's of the 97th Bombardment Group (H), eighty P-38F's of the 1st Pursuit Group, and fifty-two C-47's of the 60th Transport Group. The C-47's were to carry maintenance crews and other personnel, and, as had been planned, one B-17 was to lead four pursuits. Those B-17's, which were not assigned to lead pursuits, were to go first.<sup>23</sup>

The first Bolero flight consisting of eighteen B-17's took off from Presque Isle for Goose Bay on June 23, and all arrived safely. They left Goose Bay for BW-1 three days later, but, this time, only half arrived at the destination. Of the remaining nine, six returned to Goose Bay and three made forced landings at various points on the Greenland coast. No one was injured and the crews were soon rescued. This mishap, which was attributed to the inexperience of the crews, poor forecasting, and inadequate communications, underlined the fact that the route was not yet ready for use.<sup>24</sup>

As late as June 18, Col. C. R. Storrie, an experienced Ferrying Command operations officer, who had been sent out for a last minute inspection of the route, reported that faulty coordination among communications, cryptographic, and weather offices often delayed the receipt and dissemination of essential weather information. He also drew attention to the inexperience of the weather and communications personnel, to the inadequate number of weather stations reporting, and to the general weakness of radio signals in the area. Some three weeks later, Colonel Storrie reported that the route was still "inadequate" in communications, weather, parking facilities, billeting [and] messing." The shortage of personnel, he added, was contributing to the difficulty of getting good communications and accurate knowledge of aircraft movements.<sup>25</sup>

These difficulties were not easily overcome. In mid-July, before the first movement was completed, six P-38's and two B-17's were forced down on the Greenland ice-cap after losing their bearings during a flight from BW-8 to Reykjavik. No blame could be at-

<sup>23</sup>Annex No. 1 to VIII-Fighter Comd Opr O No. 7-A, June 18, 1942; Eighth Air Force History, I: 101-102.

<sup>24</sup>Ltr Col. Benjamin F. Giles, CO NAW to CG FC, June 29, 1942, sub: B-17 Flight from Goose to Greenland, in ATC Historical File; North Atlantic Division History, I: 216, 220.

<sup>25</sup>Ltr Col. Storrie to CO NAW, June 18, 1942; ltr Col. Storrie to CO NAW, July 7, 1942.



tached to route operations in the matter and, as in the earlier crashes, there was neither loss of life nor serious injury.<sup>26</sup>

Actually, it is surprising that there were not more crashes. Personnel at the bases was still short, and route facilities were neither complete nor well integrated. Many of the Eighth Air Force flight crews, and particularly the navigators and radio operators, were not only inexperienced but also poorly trained. Moreover, the division of command between the Ferrying Command and the Eighth Air Force control officers led to seemingly endless confusion. General George had warned in early June that the route would not be able to function efficiently under divided command. Colonel Arnold, indeed, was convinced that a large part of the difficulties encountered during the movement could be "definitely attributed" to the fact that the Eighth Air Force control officers were inexperienced in directing ferrying operations and were unfamiliar with the problems of flying the North Atlantic.<sup>27</sup>

The lesson was not lost upon either General Spaatz or General Hunter. After a careful review of the situation, both concluded that the divided control in effect during the first movement had not produced the best results.

On July 23, General Spaatz wrote to General Arnold recommending that only experienced flight crews, familiar with the route and assigned to it, should be permitted to es-

cort pursuit units. This, he felt, would tend "to smooth out certain operating difficulties heretofore experienced, due to their familiarity with weather, terrain, operating procedures, etc." General Spaatz urged, therefore, that the Ferrying Command (by that time renamed the Air Transport Command) establish a permanent, pursuit escort group made up of experienced navigators, radio operators and, whenever possible, airline pilots.<sup>28</sup>

In a letter to General Spaatz on August 16, General Hunter noted that a large number of navigators assigned to the lead airplanes during the first movement were "in no way" qualified for that duty. He held that the key to success of the operation was competent and experienced flight crews "detailed to the route on a permanent basis," and added that "divided authority and control over such a system leads only to delays and confusion."<sup>29</sup>

General George's comment on General Hunter's report was that "several of the most important recommendations covered" had been made by the Ferrying Command prior to the departure of the first Bolero movement. These recommendations, he recalled, were that Ferrying Command crews should be placed in all lead aircraft, and that the Command as "the agency controlling the route and transient facilities at the various bases should exercise operational control." "The failure of the Eighth Air Force to concede this point," he concluded, "resulted in a tremendous amount of confusion and low operating efficiency."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup>Memo Col. Arnold for Gen. George, Sept 5, 1942, sub: Bolero Control and Accident of Six P-38's and Two B-17's, with incls, in 361, ATC Central Files.

<sup>27</sup>Memo Gen. George for CG AAF, June 3, 1942, sub: Report of Inspection Trip to Determine Adequacy of Bolero Facilities and Air Route; R&R CG ATC to AFACT, Sept 18, 1942; ltr Col. Arnold to CG ATC, Aug 6, 1943, sub: Report of Development of the North Atlantic Wing, March 1942-August 1942; Eighth Air Force History, I: 101-103; North Atlantic Division History, I: 228-230.

<sup>28</sup>Memo Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, ETOUSA, for CG AAF, July 23, 1942, sub: Bolero Ferry Route, in ATC Historical File.

<sup>29</sup>Memo Brig. Gen. Frank D. O'Hunter, CG VIII Fighter Comd, ETOUSA, for Gen. Spaatz, Aug 16, 1942, sub: Recommendations, Ferry Plan, North Atlantic Route, in ATC Historical File.

<sup>30</sup>R&R CG ATC to AFACT, Sept 18, 1942.

## CONCLUSION

The first Bolero aircraft to be ferried over the route arrived at Prestwick on July 1, 1942. The entire first movement was completed by late July, and full control of the route and of aircraft movements over it passed at that time to the Air Transport Command. Notwithstanding the misfortunes which befell the first movement, the route soon settled down to efficient operation. With experience and additional equipment, the weather and communications services improved markedly; adequate base facilities became the rule; and the tactical crews, with a longer period of training, began to give a better account of themselves. The old confusion was gone. Experienced ATC control officers briefed and dispatched the Bolero planes; ATC command pilots, navigators and radio operators flew in the lead bombers; and safe delivery over the route of Eighth Air Force planes became a routine matter. The monthly accident rate, 8.9 percent in June, fell to 3.9 percent in July, and to just under 3 percent in August and September. Before winter icing conditions caused the Bolero movement to be diverted to the South Atlantic route, nearly 900 planes of the Air Force had been ferried to the United Kingdom via the

North Atlantic, most of them over the short range route.<sup>81</sup>

Replacement ferrying over the route by ATC pilots began in mid-September 1942, and followed by a month the first bombing mission of the Eighth Air Force in Europe. The mission, a high-level attack on the marshalling yards at Rouen-Sotteville, was flown on August 17 by twelve B-17E bombers of the 97th Bombardment Group which had been ferried over the short-range route during late June and early July.<sup>82</sup> This was but the first American blow in the grand aerial offensive in which the Americans by day and the British by night were to destroy the *Luftwaffe*, work havoc with the German war potential, and soften up the continent for invasion. The majority of the AAF planes in that devastating offensive were flown to the United Kingdom over the Bolero route.

<sup>81</sup>Memo Col. Arnold for Col. William H. Tunner, Dec 17, 1942, sub: Ferrying of Aircraft, North Atlantic Route, *et seq.*, in 373, ATC Central Files; North Atlantic Division History, I: 229, 282-285, 287-288.

<sup>82</sup>2nd ind Maj. Stacy M. Reed, Exec O, AC/AS Intel to CG ATC, Sept 23, 1944 to ltr CG NOLD to CG ATC, (n.d.) Sept 1942, sub: First Combat Mission of AAF in Europe; ltr Capt. A. A. Lurie to CG EURD ATC, Apr 19, 1945, sub: Historical Data, in ATC Historical File; Eighth Air Force History, I: 102; II: 79; FERD, History of the Ferrying Division, Air Transport Command, III: 153.

## NOTICE

Beginning in 1948 the annual cost of membership in the Institute, or subscription to *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, will be \$3.50. This increase was made necessary by a new rise in printing costs, effective in 1948.



## THE NAKED TRUTH OF BATTLE

BY JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS\*

"On the actual day of battle," General Sir Ian Hamilton once said, "naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have begun to get into their uniforms."

To recover the truths with their uniforms off, the War Department in the summer of 1943 established the Historical Branch under the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff. The Branch was given the mission of preparing detailed narratives of military operations, along with theatre and campaign histories, a popular account of the Second World War, and ultimately the official history of the war. A group of scholars, including the well known historians Henry Steele Commager and James P. Baxter 3d, served as advisers.

Such official interest in scholarly histories of military operations was something new in the United States. In Germany professional soldiers like Delbrück and von Clausewitz long ago established a great tradition of military history. They fostered elaborate reports of Prussian campaigns, not to enlighten the people, but so that the military might learn from the experience of others. After the first World War, the Germans made meticulous studies of the records to find out just what went wrong, just what should be done differently next time. Military history was but another device for their rearmament.

The War Department had different motives. The historians were to inform the sol-

diers and the people as a whole, as well as the high command. Their accounts were to be comprehensive, impartial, annotated narratives of operations, authoritative enough to form an important source for the studies of future historians. In the meantime, short histories of operations, later called the American Forces in Action Series, were to be published for the men who took part, especially for those who were wounded.

It was soon discovered that the type of history desired could not be written from the records alone. Not that records were unavailable; the paper work of one division for one week of action will fill a filing cabinet. The trouble was simply that the records constituted the truths in uniform. The messages, the intelligence summaries, the field orders, the operations reports and all the other records (which must be sent to the War Department under army rules) left huge gaps in the story of the action; they were often meaningless or misleading on the most vital questions. As a result, officers and enlisted historians were assigned to the battle fronts to observe operations and write the histories on the spot.

Late in 1943, when the invasion of the "soft underbelly" was under way on one side of the world and the great drive across the Pacific was just getting started on the other, a new kind of "attachment" began to make his appearance at army posts and camps abroad. He was the combat historian. What his job was he himself was not entirely sure, and certainly no one else knew. Usually he was attached to the intelligence officer, who already suffered from an embarrassment of riches in the form of photo interpreters, public relations men, translators, psychological

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warfare experts, and other specialists, and who sometimes wondered what new variety of life Washington would foist on him. One unfortunate historian reached his unit in a remote jungle in the middle of a typhoon, reporting to a harassed G-2 who had never heard of him, of the historical program, or of orders assigning him to the unit.

But to their own surprise as much as anyone else's, the historians discovered that they got along pretty well. True, some of the commanders had to be convinced that the recent addition was not a new and streamlined edition of the Inspector General sent out from Washington. Once satisfied, their suspicions gave way to active interest. The commanders sensed that some day the only thing left of all their efforts would be a place in history. Many of them had read military history and had definite ideas about it—often very good ideas. The historians were usually able to get what they wanted in the way of records, facilities, and even access to that military inner sanctum, the staff meeting.

When the outfits moved into action, the historians discovered that for them, too, the battle was the pay-off. Indeed, the historians were first of all soldiers. They learned the hard way about foxholes, fire discipline, guarding the perimeter; they soon caught on to the little tricks that made the soldier's life easier or safer. They discovered that the more they wanted to see of battle, the more risks they had to run. They had to balance the risks against the possible rewards, taking quite literally the injunction that "History is written by the survivors."

The Army, which has an SOP—Standing Operating Procedure—for almost every variety of military undertaking, had none for combat history. By trial and error the historians worked out their own. At the most there were two historians available per infantry division, and in some operations only one.

A division in action consists of nearly twenty thousand men spread out over many square miles, engaged in such diverse activities as firing on the enemy, maneuvering tanks, building roads, tending to the wounded, stringing up telephone wire, unloading ships. To follow such a vast enterprise might seem to require a dozen historians. Actually, one or two could do the job by keeping close to the command posts, where all the diverse strands of activity came together. Messages on naval gunfire support, air action, enemy movements, ground gained and lost, and all the other activities funneled into the operations and intelligence sections, where the historians could see them.

The messages and reports alone were a mere skeleton, however. The historians worked their way forward from regimental or division command posts. At the battalion CP, which was often within a mile of the front, they found a note of urgency which was not apparent in the rear areas. At the same time, the battalion staffs usually knew enough of the over-all picture to retain a certain amount of perspective; for that reason the battalion CP's were excellent places for the historian to gather material.

Often the historians went on ahead to watch the line companies in action. By now they were in touch with a tiny portion of the battle and their perspective had shrunk—but that portion was under their microscope. They saw how the men moved forward, how supporting weapons were used, where the enemy lay and what kind of defense he was putting up; they heard the orders over the walkie-talkie and often they saw men die. Sometimes they found themselves acting as ammunition carriers, as spotters for artillery, as riflemen.

No matter how close the historians got to the front, however, there was usually a distinct limit to what they could see. It was exceedingly difficult to follow infantry action,

even from a good observation post. By training and instinct the men on both sides merged with their backgrounds like chameleons; smoke and dust often obscured the battlefield. The main reward for going forward was the feel of the battle, and an idea of the terrain over which men were fighting.

Most important of all, the historians at the front could talk to the fighting men who remembered vividly the recent action. There was as much waiting in the front lines as anywhere else in the army, and during the periods of "layin' around" the historians interviewed the captains, lieutenants, and sergeants who had the grim job of translating paper plans into so many yards gained and so many of the enemy destroyed. They were well informed and they liked to talk, especially when they had someone from "higher headquarters" who would listen to their gripes as well as their accounts of action.

A historian with his own jeep was usually able to cover two battalions—which would be four rifle companies on line—in one day. It was important for them to work out of regimental or division headquarters, and to return there at night. If they stayed at the front too long, their perspective was stunted; they came to feel that the battle was won or lost in the front lines alone. Actually the battle was fought behind the lines too, and the operations colonel in his quiet command post, the weary maintenance men servicing disabled tanks, the engineers building a new supply road, or failing to maintain the old one, exercised as critical an influence on operations as the front line fighters. It was the vital job of the historian to perceive the role of all elements of the combat teams by keeping the broad picture in mind, but at the same time to achieve in his writing the fidelity that comes from intimate contact with battle.

The hardest, most exciting work of the combat historian came directly after the bat-

tle, when he pieced together the story of the operations by systematically interrogating the units that took part. It was in these unit interrogations that the truths of battle shed their uniforms. From the lips of eyewitnesses and participants came the detailed accounts of action that enabled the historian to clear away the "fog of war."

A pioneer in the development of the interrogation method was Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, who, as an observer in the Makin operation of November 1943, pointed out that no one had an accurate idea of just what had transpired in the operation as a whole, although everyone remembered vividly what he had personally seen and done. As an experiment, Colonel Marshall spent four days interrogating several small units. He wrote later in the *Infantry Journal*:

By the end of those four days, working several hours every day, we had discovered to our amazement that every fact of the fight was procurable—that the facts lay dormant in the minds of men and officers, waiting to be developed. It was like fitting together a jigsaw puzzle, a puzzle with no missing pieces but with so many curious and difficult twists and turns that only with care and patience could we make it into a single picture of combat.

The unit interrogation became a standard feature of the combat historian's "research." The group meetings were held at each company with officers present as well as members of every platoon and squad that saw action. Informality was stressed. The available members of the company, anywhere from 25 to 150 of them, sat on the ground around a blackboard or sand plot. The historian acted as leader of the discussion, plotting the company's positions or movements as the action unfolded. Often the troops were still tired from combat, but they enjoyed the discussions and learned the whole nature of the battle, only a tiny fraction of which they had seen from their foxhole. Through the historian the participants virtually wrote their



own history.

The group meeting was one occasion in the army when the officers and enlisted men met as equals. The historians made clear at the outset that the recollections of the private were as important as those of the commander, that "truth knows no rank." As it turned out, everyone's information was necessary to obtain the whole picture. Most infantry action was so complex and so dispersed over the ground that many memories had to mesh together to develop a full and accurate account. The members of a platoon could tell an exciting story of how they made their way around the enemy's flank, but their adventures were meaningless unless their commander was on hand to explain what he hoped to gain by the maneuver. At the same time, the general plans were far more vivid if the troops could disclose what they had to go through to carry them out.

A football coach chancing on one of these discussions would have been reminded of his Monday afternoon critiques of Saturday's game; a lawyer, of a typical courtroom proceeding. The historian asked endless questions. Where was the enemy located? How did the company deploy? What type of fire was received? Why was our left flank advanced? Why did it later pull back? When did supporting artillery open up? What use was made of tanks? What did the platoon leader say after he was hit? Except in actions where survivors were few, it was not hard to get answers to such questions.

It is said that fighting men do not like to talk about their experiences, but the historians did not find this to be the case. Usually the men were glad to tell about their own experiences; invariably they wanted to tell about their buddies'. But the heroic, even if it was present in the action, was conspicuously absent in the recounting. The soldier's tale was of how tired he was, how frightened, how happy when his ordeal was

over. The true story came out when someone else described the action. Or after the meeting a soldier might come up to the historian and say something like, "Jones didn't tell you about this, but he went through some hot fire to get that message back to the captain." Truth did out!

During the last phases of the war, our operations in both Europe and the Pacific were too vast and extended to permit intensive interrogations of all companies. The small-unit interrogations were used only for the pivotal actions of the campaign. It was discovered, however, that the interrogation technique was equally effective for studying higher command plans and decisions. After the companies were interrogated, meetings were held with the battalion commander, his operations, intelligence and supply officers, and representatives of tank and artillery units that worked with the battalion. The process was repeated at regimental and division headquarters. Gradually the jigsaw puzzle took shape.

By the time they completed their interrogations the historians had a store of "primary materials" which might well be the envy of their colleagues in civilian life. Journals filled with observations made at the front, translations of captured enemy documents, hundreds of pages of notes on unit interrogations, thousands of messages, reports, orders, operations summaries—these were to be the sources of the final, definitive history of the operation.

But certainly the civilian historians would not have envied his brother-in-arms in other respects. For one thing, the combat historians usually had taken part in the action; it was sometimes difficult for them to record dispassionately the turbulent events which they had seen first-hand. Some of them grew over-fond of certain outfits and were sorely tempted to indulge in a little "boosting." Then there were the generals who reviewed

every chapter as it was written and who made their own versions known in subtle—or unsubtle—ways. These difficulties were best met by letting the historians do their writing in rear areas. An insidious handicap to scholarly work was occasionally the military background of the historians themselves; most of them had served in some branch, and the ex-infantryman sometimes failed to do full justice to the efforts of the artillery, the ex-tanker suspected that the foot troops were not giving enough support to the armor, and so on. A quick cure for this situation was to have the historian serve at the front with all major arms.

In a real sense, however, the combat historians had the same mission as any other scholar who wishes to do more than simply record events. After they had collected their material and studied it, they inevitably faced the question, what were the reasons for the battle having gone as it did? In searching for the truth of battle they had to grapple with the whole problem of cause and effect.

For example, on an attack transport moving toward a target, a soldier on KP pulled a huge cherry pie out of the oven, dropped it on his foot, and was so badly burned that he was out of action for several weeks. One asks: might the loss of this man impair the squad's effectiveness, the company's, the regiment's—perhaps affect the course of the entire operation? In modern war could one apply the old lesson, "For want of a nail the shoe was lost . . ."? During the battle of Okinawa, a suicide plane crash-dived a regimental command ship and wiped out an entire regimental staff, killing the commander, the executive officer, the operations officer, and killing or wounding almost all the other key personnel. Did this *Kamikaze* pilot, in his last desperate act for the Emperor, unknowingly determine the course of some future engagement?

These questions would have seemed famil-

iar to Tolstoy. The author of *War and Peace* was intrigued by the *planlessness* of war, by the extent to which the little unexpected things influenced the course of battle. "Any battle—Tarutino, Borodino, Austerlitz—is fought," he said, "in a different way from those who plan for it suppose it will be. That is the essential condition. An infinite number of uncontrollable forces—for never is a man more uncontrollable than in battle, when it is a matter of life and death—and an infinite number of these independent forces influence the direction of the battle."

The "cherry pie incident" never panned out, however. The soldier was easily replaced. The regiment that lost its staff was given a new one, and went on to perform creditably in the operation. Nor did many of the other "independent forces" seem to change the course of battle. Historians discovered cases of messages being lost, vehicles breaking down, orders being misunderstood, weapons failing to operate, men making unaccountable blunders in battle. But rarely did such incidents measurably influence the outcome of the battle.

Tolstoy doubtless was justified in emphasizing the planlessness of war in the early 1800's. But war today, at least as it appears after analysis, seems to be different. Unexpected events still affect military developments, but there is such a vast amount of action according to plan that the variations are submerged in its tremendous momentum.

The reason for the difference between Tolstoy's time and ours lies partly in modern communications and transportation. Traditionally, battles have turned on communications failures. In this war a general communications breakdown was impossible because of the quantity and variety of our equipment. An army still travels on its stomach, but modern equipment revolutionized the whole process of supply. The Army

transported thousands of tons of supplies over routes that would have stopped horse-drawn wagons in Tolstoy's day, not to speak of air transport. No secret weapons, but simply the scientific and engineering talents of America transplanted to the battlefield.

But the greatest factor giving stability and order to our military operations, the historians discovered, was the enormous firepower we could muster. That was the crux of battle.

When a troop commander came up against an enemy strongpoint, he did not throw his troops against the enemy's rifle and machine gun fire. Such a tactic belonged to another age. He simply called in his heavier supporting weapons. To begin with, the commander might bring up mortars or heavy machine guns. If the enemy replied with the same, our commander called for something heavier, perhaps light artillery and light tanks. If the enemy could still match us with similar weapons, the commander had other resources—he called up heavier tanks and artillery, perhaps light and medium bombers.

At some point in this process our fire power so exceeded that of the enemy that his position became untenable. For the historians, this was the most dramatic point in modern battle. For the summoning of power that the enemy could not duplicate was the decisive

link between this particular engagement and the technical and industrial resources of the nation. The decision of the commander to bring up the heavier supporting fire actually put into play the whole weight of the economy behind the front. He refused to meet the enemy on the enemy's terms; he forced the enemy to fight on his own terms, and these terms were made possible by the superior technology and resources of our country.

Thus the historians traveled a long way from the battlefield itself in seeking the reasons for our victories. They could be fascinated by the little mistakes that were inevitably made, but our superior communications, transport, and firepower allowed an enormous margin for error. They marveled at the heroism of our men under fire and at the skilful way they fought, but the enemy was reacting with shrewdness and fanaticism. They discovered that what really counted was the quality and quantity of the equipment on our side. Such equipment made it possible that operations would go "according to plan," that even a series of unlucky and unlooked for events would not disrupt the program. The historian's search for the ultimate truth of modern battle ended up in the planned use of a whole economy for military purposes.



# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

BY HENRY P. BEERS

## PART IV (CONCLUSION)

### CHIEFS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The formation of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations provided the Navy Department with an organization which enabled it to prepare for war and after the coming of war to direct the operations of the fleet. The office was only partly organized at the advent of war, but it formed a cadre to which new units were easily added. Some of the new functions were necessarily temporary, while others proved to be lasting and were the basis upon which new divisions and sections were permanently established. The war greatly raised the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in importance. Duties which Congress and the Secretary had denied it were vouchsafed to it as a result of the pressure of wartime conditions. The exigencies of war forced a voluntary cooperation of all activities in the department under the coordination of the Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>1</sup> What his office gained during the war, it sought thereafter to retain.

The term of the Chief of Naval Operations is limited by the act of March 3, 1915 to a period of four years. Because of the unusual conditions, Admiral Benson's tenure was extended somewhat beyond this period. From November 11, 1918 to July 1, 1919 he was absent in Europe, serving as naval adviser to the United States peace commission. Capt. William V. Pratt administered the

office from October 17, 1918 to December 2, 1918; Rear Admiral Robert E. Coontz from December 3, 1918 to January 4, 1919; Rear Admiral Josiah S. McKean, who had been designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations on January 3, 1919, from January 5 to June 20, 1919. Rear Admiral Benson returned to the United States on June 30, 1919 and resumed the duties of his office at Washington.<sup>2</sup> Upon Benson's retirement on September 25, 1919 Rear Admiral McKean again acted as Chief of Naval Operations until November 1, when Coontz took over the duties of that office.<sup>3</sup> He was succeeded on July 21, 1923 by Rear Admiral Edward W. Eberle, the recent commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, who served until November 14, 1927. The next occupant of the office was Charles F. Hughes, recent President of the Naval War College (1923-1924) and Director of Fleet Training (1924-1925), and he was succeeded on September 17, 1930 by William V. Pratt. The latter's place was taken on July 1, 1933 by William H. Standley, who had been Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in 1928-1930. The next Chief of Naval Operations was a former Chief of

<sup>2</sup>*Naval Investigation Hearings*, 1920, 1818. Testimony of Admiral W. S. Benson, May 4, 1920. In this same source (p. 1617) McKean stated he served as acting Chief of Naval Operations until June 21, 1919.

<sup>3</sup>For an account of his activities as Chief of Naval Operations see his *From the Mississippi to the Sea* (Philadelphia, 1930), 399ff.

<sup>1</sup>Secretary's Files, 3980 1853, W. C. Cole, Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations, July 14, 1923.

the Bureau of Navigation (1933-1935), William D. Leahy, from January 2, 1937 to August 1, 1939. His successor was Harold D. Stark, the recent commander of the Cruisers, Battle Force.

#### AVIATION DIVISION

Important developments in regard to naval aviation took place after the war. At its conclusion the Aviation Division comprised nearly 200 persons of whom 67 were officers.<sup>4</sup> The aviation service comprised 51 aviation units with personnel of 3,117 officers and 32,873 enlisted men.<sup>5</sup> Of the 22 aviation stations maintained abroad at this time all but two had been demobilized by February 22, 1919. Capt. Thomas T. Craven succeeded Irwin as the Director of Naval Aviation in May 1919.

Until 1919 aviation activities in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations were concentrated in the Aviation Division into which the Office of Naval Aviation developed.<sup>6</sup> On August 1, 1919, however, the department's policy of merging aviation activities with those of other naval activities was announced.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly on August 7 the duties of the Aviation Division were distributed.<sup>8</sup> An Aviation Section was set up under the Planning Division to which the Director of Naval Aviation was moved. The material sections of the Aviation Division were transferred to the Material Division of Operations together with the units having cognizance of air stations. The training and detail of personnel, photography, training of



REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD W. EBERLE

pigeons, aerography, and navigation instruments were transferred to the Bureau of Navigation. Control of the operations of aircraft was shifted to the Division of Operating Forces. The Aircraft Test Board went to the Board of Inspection and Survey. Other functions passed to the Gunnery Exercises and Engineering Performances Division and to the Communication Division. Henceforth the Aviation Section was concerned with war plans and plans related to current administrative work.

The decentralization of activities connected with naval aviation was a backward rather than a forward step and was soon corrected. Recommendations were made in the follow-

<sup>4</sup>Bureau of Aeronautics, General Files, 3084-0-14, Memorandum T. T. Craven for Chief Clerk of Naval Operations, Dec. 3, 1920.

<sup>5</sup>Secretary's Files, 5087-185, Annual Report of the Chief of Naval Operations; Oct. 20, 1919.

<sup>6</sup>U. S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, August 1, 1918, 9.

<sup>7</sup>Secretary's Files, 26983-1055½, Inter-office order, W. S. Benson, Aug. 1, 1919.

<sup>8</sup>Bureau of Aeronautics, General Files, 602-4, Memorandum, W. S. Benson, Aug. 7, 1919.

ing year for the establishment of a Bureau of Aeronautics. The existing aviation organization was regarded as defective because it placed chief responsibility in the Chief of Naval Operations, who was not in a position to give adequate attention to the development of aviation.<sup>9</sup> Cognizance was not limited either to Operations, for the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and Navigation were likewise involved.<sup>10</sup> The scattering of aviation functions in various offices throughout the department was not calculated to foster its development. Admiral Coontz himself believed that the growing importance of naval aviation warranted better administration. After Congress had provided for the Bureau of Aeronautics on July 12, 1921, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, who had become Director of Naval Aviation on December 14, 1920, was placed in charge of it.<sup>11</sup>

The Bureau of Aeronautics was placed in operation on September 1, 1921, and to it were transferred the aviation duties which had been carried on by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Aerography, which had been transferred from Operations to the Bureau of Navigation in October 1919,<sup>12</sup> was likewise placed under the new bureau.

#### INSPECTION DIVISION

An Inspection Division was established in 1919 composed of the Board of Inspection and Survey and the Joint Merchant Vessel Board.<sup>13</sup> Under the former board there

operated on the Pacific Coast a Board to Inspect Vessels on Pacific Coast. The designation of this board was changed on the recommendation of its senior member in 1920 to Board of Inspection and Survey, Pacific Coast Section.<sup>14</sup> In 1921 the Navy Department Reorganization Board recommended the reestablishment of the Division of Inspections as it had existed under the Aid System, but this was not done.

#### SHIPS' MOVEMENTS DIVISION

The Division of Operating Forces, which was charged with the movements of all naval craft not used for training and experimental purposes,<sup>15</sup> was changed in 1920 to the Ships' Movements Division.<sup>16</sup> As a part of its duties this division maintained a variety of statistics and records pertaining to the movements of ships.

#### INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

After the war the Office of Naval Intelligence closed its branch offices and discontinued the intelligence offices located at naval district headquarters. Some reduction was also made in the number of stations occupied by naval attachés abroad, but the important ones in existence prior to the war were maintained. In 1922 this office was designated the Intelligence Division, but it has continued to be called the Office of Naval Intelligence as well.

#### DIVISION OF FLEET TRAINING

The Gunnery Exercises and Engineering Performances Division resumed the direction

<sup>9</sup>U. S. Navy Dept., *Annual Report*, 1920, 53-54.

<sup>10</sup>For the division of cognizance of aviation see Navy Department General Orders Nos. 41, June 23, 1913; 222, June 20, 1916; 469, May 5, 1919.

<sup>11</sup>Coontz, *op. cit.*, 408.

<sup>12</sup>Frederick J. Nelson, "The History of Aerology in the Navy," *U. S. Naval Inst. Proc.*, LX (April 1934), 525.

<sup>13</sup>This division was apparently established by Revised Organization Orders of the Office of Naval Operations, August 1, 1919 (Washington, 1919), 12. See also *U. S. Navy Directory*, Sept. 1, 1919, 456; Oct. 1, 1919, 246.

<sup>14</sup>Secretary's Files, 10308-52, H. O. Stickney to Secretary of the Navy via Board of Inspection and Survey, June 25, 1920; *U. S. Navy Directory*, Dec. 1, 1920, 186.

<sup>15</sup>Revised Organization Orders of the Office of Naval Operations, August 1, 1919, 8.

<sup>16</sup>*U. S. Navy Directory*, April 1, 1920, 194; Feb. 1, 1920, 199; June 1, 1920, 187.



following the war of competition among vessels of the Navy for gunnery and engineering trophies. It also took charge of gunnery and bombing practice by aircraft, and on February 18, 1919 the first instructions for this training were issued by the Secretary of the Navy. This division was discontinued and its functions were incorporated into the new Division of Fleet Training on June 6, 1923.<sup>17</sup> Its duties were of a broader nature and embraced all phases of fleet training, which were to be based upon approved war plans. Fleet exercises as well as gunnery and engineering competitions came under its jurisdiction.

#### NAVAL DISTRICTS DIVISION

The Naval Districts Division was busy after the war in handling activities connected with demobilization in naval districts. At the time of the armistice there were 405 leased and chartered vessels, 313 purchased vessels, and 133 vessels borrowed from other government departments in the various naval districts.<sup>18</sup> The return and disposal of these vessels was proceeded with as rapidly as possible, and was accomplished in considerable part by the end of 1919. For several more years the division continued to dispose of these and other vessels acquired by the Navy during the war. To it was also assigned the task of selling obsolete naval vessels.

#### FLEET MAINTENANCE DIVISION

The Division of Material concerned itself after the war with perfecting the means of coordinating all activities connected with the maintenance of vessels in material condition. Up-to-date information about every vessel is maintained by means of reports from the fleet, navy yards, and the material bureaus.

These data are utilized in making vessels available for repairs in ways which will keep the navy yards busy and at the same time not interfere with the training of the fleet. Through voluntary cooperation of all activities of the department under the coordination of the Chief of Naval Operations, this end had been accomplished during the war, but with the release of the pressure of the war it became difficult to continue this cooperation. The necessity of vesting this coordinative power in the Chief of Naval Operations was realized, and finally in 1923 he was authorized to supervise the work of the department connected with repairs and alterations vessels.<sup>19</sup> In carrying on this work the division has worked in close cooperation with the Ships' Movements Division of Operations and the Navy Yard Division (later Shore Establishments Division) of the Office of the Assistant Secretary.<sup>20</sup> From the standpoint of operative and military requirements the division has charge of coordinating the efforts of the material bureaus in connection with new construction. It also has the duty of preparing war plans related to the work of the division. Effective May 1, 1934, the division became known as the Fleet Maintenance Division.<sup>21</sup>

#### BUDGET OFFICER

The Budget and Accounting Act of June 10, 1921 established a centralized budget system in the Federal Government by concentrating in the President all authority and responsibility for formulating the annual budget. The Bureau of the Budget was

<sup>17</sup>Secretary's Files, 3980-1853, Changes in Navy Regulations, No. 6, August 30, 1923.

<sup>20</sup>U. S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with Duties Assigned the Offices Thereunder, October 1, 1937, 14-15.

<sup>21</sup>Secretary's Files, EN 3/A3-1 Chief of Naval Operations to all bureaus and offices, Navy Department, April 25, 1934; *U. S. Navy Directory*, July 1, 1934, 210; Oct. 1, 1934, 210.

<sup>17</sup>By Navy Department General Order No. 108.

<sup>18</sup>Secretary's Files, 3087-185, Annual Report of the Chief of Naval Operations, Oct. 20, 1919.

placed in the Department of the Treasury, but it was to operate under the supervision of the President. Under Section 214 of the foregoing act, which required the appointment of budget officers in each department and independent agency, the Secretary of the Navy on July 5, 1921 designated the Chief of Naval Operations as the Budget Officer of the Department of the Navy.<sup>22</sup> Budget officers were also designated in the various bureaus of the department, and their names were communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Coontz served as Budget Officer for only two years, the duty being transferred to the Secretary's Office upon the appointment of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss as Budget Officer on July 14, 1923.<sup>23</sup>

#### INSULAR AFFAIRS

Through the Spanish War either directly or indirectly the United States acquired outlying possessions in the West Indies and the Pacific area. A naval station was established at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 26, 1898. The public lands on the small neighboring island of Culebra were placed under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department by executive order of December 17, 1901. For a while after the occupation of Cuba a naval station was maintained at Havana. On July 2, 1903 a lease was executed with Cuba for a site for a naval base at Guantanamo. The island of Guam in the distant Ladronez was captured by the *Charleston* on June 21, 1898 and placed under the Navy Department by executive order of December 23, 1898. Under the terms of agreements with Hawaii of 1875 and 1884 a coal depot was established at Honolulu in May 1898. Following the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands by joint

resolution of July 7, 1898, a naval station was developed at Honolulu. Wake Island was taken possession of by Commander E. D. Taussig of the *Bennington* on January 17, 1899. By agreement concluded with Great Britain and Germany on February 16, 1900 the United States acquired the islands of Tutuila, Rose and Manua in the Samoan group. Three days after this treaty these islands were placed under the control of the Navy Department for a naval station. In the Philippines the Department acquired, naval stations at Cavite and Olongapo. Midway Island, one of the Hawaiian group, which had been regarded as an American possession from as early as 1869, was placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy by executive order of January 20, 1903.

Of these places only Guam and Samoa were under direct naval supervision. The reason for acquiring them and the naval stations at other possessions was that in time of war they would constitute bases for naval operations. As is well known today, little was done to develop some of them for that purpose.

The acquisition of these places presented to the Department of the Navy the problem of their administration. Adopting a recommendation made by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation on January 17, 1900,<sup>24</sup> the Secretary of the Navy placed the supervision of the outlying stations under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.<sup>25</sup>

About the time of the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations the insular affairs of the Navy Department became more prominent. To suppress disorder and to force agreement to a customs convention, a military occupation of Haiti was effected in July 1915 by the landing of

<sup>22</sup>U. S. Navy Dept., *Annual Report*, 1922, 44; Secretary's Files, 29370-8, Edwin Denby to Chief of Naval Operations, July 5, 1921.

<sup>23</sup>U. S. Navy Dept., *Annual Report*, 1923, 121.

<sup>24</sup>Secretary's Files, 10568, A. S. Crowninshield to the Secretary of the Navy, Jan. 17, 1900.

<sup>25</sup>By Executive Order No. 538, Feb. 2, 1900.

U. S. Marines. A similar occupation of Santo Domingo took place in June 1916, and on November 29, 1916 a military government was inaugurated under a succession of high-ranking naval officers. These occupations continued until 1930 in Haiti and 1924 in Santo Domingo. The Virgin Islands purchased from Denmark in 1917 were placed pursuant to the act of Congress of March 3 of that year under the Navy Department. Until 1931, when jurisdiction of the islands was transferred to the Department of the Interior, they were governed by naval officers appointed by the President. In these islands a naval station was maintained at St. Thomas. The islands under naval governors — Virgin Islands, Guam, and Samoa — Puerto Rico and the naval station at Guantanamo were placed directly under the Chief of Naval Operations in 1919 for all military matters.<sup>26</sup>

After some years of handling the affairs of the island possessions in an uncoordinated fashion provision was made for central control in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. An officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence proposed in March 1921 the institution of an insular desk in some branch of Operations over which all correspondence concerning Guam, Samoa, and possibly the Virgin Islands could pass, thus providing a place in the department which would be cognizant of the general situation in those places.<sup>27</sup> Nearly all the bureau chiefs believed that such a desk would delay matters. Admiral Coontz, the Chief of Naval Operations, favored the suggestion and believed in addition that matters pertaining to Haiti and Santo Domingo might be included.<sup>28</sup> The Navy Department Reorganization Board

strongly recommended a centralized agency in the Department to effect a more efficient administration of its insular affairs.<sup>29</sup> This recommendation was concurred in by the United States Bureau of Efficiency.

By order of the Secretary of the Navy an insular desk was established in the Navy Department on February 28, 1922.<sup>30</sup> It was charged with expediting the transaction of insular affairs under the cognizance of the department in Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Santo Domingo, and Haiti with cognizance of all matters pertaining to insular administration and policy. It was to receive and act upon all mail from or pertaining to the insular governments, except correspondence relative to details ordinarily under the direct cognizance of bureaus or offices of the Department or of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. The insular desk was placed under the Policy and Liaison Section of the Planning Division.

#### CENTRAL DIVISION

In 1923 the Policy Section of the Planning Division became the Policy and Liaison Section under the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Its expanded functions included departmental plans, liaison between the Navy Department and other executive departments, naval administration of insular possessions under the supervision of the Navy Department and places under naval occupation, and editing and arranging Navy regulations and general orders.<sup>31</sup> The status of the section was changed to that of a division (Central Division) on December 15, 1930 by order of

<sup>26</sup>Secretary's Files, 24514-846:29, General Order No. 372, Jan. 3, 1919.

<sup>27</sup>Secretary's Files, 28642-42, Memorandum Robert Henderson, March 26, 1921.

<sup>28</sup>Secretary's Files, 28642-42, Memorandum for Secretary's Conference, R. E. Coontz.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 27325-39:7, Report of the Board, July 30, 1921, 11.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 28642-42:2, Secretary to all Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department, Feb. 28, 1922.

<sup>31</sup>U. S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Revised Organization Orders of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, March 3, 1923 (Secretary's Files, 27325-40:4).





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the Chief of Naval Operation.<sup>32</sup> To the duties already mentioned were added others having to do with international relations, and matters not clearly within the cognizance of any other office or which required central coordination.

#### TECHNICAL DIVISION

Toward the close of 1935 a Technical Division was established, taking the place of the former Technical Section of the Fleet Maintenance Division.<sup>33</sup> The object of this division was to maintain liaison between the

naval service and the research resources of the country and to provide a means of keeping the Chief of Naval Operations informed of technical developments both within the Navy and in civilian enterprises.<sup>34</sup> In 1939 this branch of Operations was listed as the Office of Technical Development.<sup>35</sup> At the end of that year the functions of this division having to do with research and invention were transferred to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.<sup>36</sup> The division was thereupon discontinued.

#### RADIO LIAISON DIVISION

This division was established in 1940 as the Interdepartmental Communication Division to represent the Navy Department on various interdepartmental bodies, such as the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, the Defense Communications Board, and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics.<sup>37</sup> It also represented the Navy Department at hearings on communications before Congressional committees. Through the work of this division the Department obtained a number of new radio frequencies and has assisted in improving radio for war purposes. It became the Radio Liaison Division in 1941, and it has since been abolished.

#### NAVAL RESERVE POLICY DIVISION

For a while during 1940-1941 this division existed in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In April 1941 it was returned to the Bureau of Navigation.<sup>38</sup> Years before the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations had been charged with the initiation and formulation of department policies relating to the naval reserve, but the Bureau of Navigation

<sup>32</sup>Secretary's Files, EN3/A3-1, Chief of Naval Operations to divisions and sections of the office, Dec. 15, 1930; *U. S. Navy Directory*, Jan. 1, 1931, 197.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, EN3/A9-1, Annual Report of the Chief of Naval Operations, for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1936, 19-20; *U. S. Navy Directory*, Jan. 1, 1936, 234; Oct. 1, 1935, 216-217.

<sup>34</sup>A recommendation for a technical assistant in the department had been made in 1909 by the Moody Commission and later by Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske.

<sup>35</sup>*U. S. Navy Directory*, Oct. 1, 1939, 255.

<sup>36</sup>By Navy Department General Order No. 130, Dec. 8, 1939.

<sup>37</sup>*U. S. Navy Dept., Annual Report*, 1941, 14.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

tion had continued to administer the reserve.<sup>39</sup>

#### ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONS, 1937

In 1937 the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was organized as follows:

- Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations
- Aides to the Chief of Naval Operations
  - Personal Aide
  - Administrative Aide
  - Secret-Confidential File Room

- War Plans Division
  - Policy and Projects Section
  - Plans Section

- Central Division
  - Legislation, regulations, and organization
  - Reports and statements
  - International affairs
  - Miscellaneous
  - Island Governments

- Technical Division
- Intelligence Division
  - Foreign Intelligence
  - Domestic Intelligence
  - Historical Records
  - Public Relations

- Secretarial Division
- Communications
  - Traffic Group
  - Fleet Group
  - Communication Security Group
  - Accounting Section
  - Technical Section
  - Communication Reserve Section
  - Registered Publications Section
  - War Plans Section

- Inspection Division
  - Board of Inspection and Survey
  - Joint Merchant Vessel Board
- Fleet Training Division
  - Tactics Section
  - Gunnery Section
  - Engineering Section

- Damage Control Section
- Chemical Warfare Section
- Fleet Maintenance Division
  - Ships Section
  - War Procurement Planning Section
- Naval Districts Division
  - Naval Reserve Policy Section
  - Administrative Section
  - Merchant Marine Section
  - Shore Establishment Section
- Ships' Movements Division
  - Ships' Movements Desk
  - District Craft and Patrol Craft Desk
  - Fuel and Transportation Desk
  - Aviation Desk
  - Submarine Desk<sup>40</sup>

The Naval War College was returned to the Bureau of Navigation in 1934. By that time it had become more of an educational institution than a planning organization.

#### GENERAL STAFF

While certain organizational changes were made in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations between the conclusion of World War I and the beginning of World War II, the authority and functions of the office remained as originally established. This adherence to the original plan cannot be taken as evidence that the system has worked entirely satisfactorily. The Congressional investigation of March to May 1920 conducted by a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs demonstrated that the Navy Department had entered the war materially unprepared and without the plans necessary for the sort of warfare that had to be fought.<sup>41</sup> This investigation resulted from charges brought by Admiral Sims against the conduct of the war by the Navy Department. His object was the reorganization of the Department. Frequent suggestions for changes

<sup>39</sup>U. S. Office of Chief of Naval Operations, *Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with Duties Assigned to office thereunder* (Washington, Oct. 1937).

<sup>41</sup>Sproul, *op. cit.*, 349ff.; Morison, *op. cit.*, 441ff

<sup>39</sup>By Navy Department General Order No. 96, March 1, 1923.

in organization were made during the hearings, and letters and plans of reorganization by naval officers were submitted and printed in the report, but no action was ever taken concerning them.<sup>42</sup> Although not favored by the department, the subject has continued to engage the thought of naval officers.<sup>43</sup>

The Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the subsequent entrance of the United States into the world conflict brought about a reorganization of the Navy Department. Under the power conferred upon him by the War Powers Act of December 18, 1941 the President on that date removed the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet from the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations and put him in supreme command of the operating forces with instructions to organize a staff to plan and direct the war operations.<sup>44</sup> Admiral Ernest J. King, an air officer, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, was given command at this time of all naval operations. His headquarters were established in the Navy Department and certain divisions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations were transferred thereto. The Commander-in-Chief was to keep the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the logistic and other needs of the operating forces, while the latter was to keep the former cognizant of the extent to which these needs could be met. This proved to be an unsatisfactory arrangement, and on March 9, 1942 by order of the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral King



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assumed the post of Chief of Naval Operations in addition to his duties as Commander-in-Chief.<sup>45</sup> Thus a single officer was given command of the fleet and "direction" of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.<sup>46</sup> The latter authority had previously been denied the Chief of Naval Operations. A reorganization promulgated after the cessation of hostilities in 1945 retained for the new Chief of Naval Operations the major portions of the authority of the combined wartime post of Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>42</sup>*Naval Investigation Hearings 1920*, 3391ff. This voluminous report is abridged in the *Army and Navy Journal*, vol. LVII and analyzed in Tracy B. Kittredge, *Naval Lessons of the Great War* (N. Y., 1921).

<sup>43</sup>Yates Stirling, *Sea Duty; the Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral* (N. Y., 1939), 133-134; J. K. Taussig, "An Organization for the Navy Department," *U. S. Naval Inst. Proc.*, LXVI (Jan. 1940), 52-57; Yates Stirling, "Bureaucracy Rules the Navy; Absence of a General Staff Seriously Imperils Value of Our Naval Forces," *Current History*, LI (March 1940), 30-32.

<sup>44</sup>Executive Order No. 8984, Dec. 18, 1941, *Federal Register*, 1941, VI, pt. 6, 6569-6570; *Washington Sunday Star*, Jan. 4, 1942.

<sup>45</sup>*New York Times*, March 10, 1942; *Washington Post*, March 10, 1942.

<sup>46</sup>Albion, Robert G., "The Administration of the Navy, 1798-1945," *Public Administration Review*, V (Autumn 1945), 301.

<sup>47</sup>For suggestions made as a result of reading the manuscript of this study, the writer is indebted to Dr. James R. Masterson and Commodore Dudley W. Knox.



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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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### IN MEMORIAM

Lieutenant General James G. Harbord, one of the American Military Institute's life members, died at his home in Rye, New York, on August 20. He entered the Army in 1889 and was commissioned in 1891. From 1903 until 1914 he was assistant chief of the Philippine Constabulary, and during World War I he served variously as General Pershing's chief of staff, as commander of the Marine Brigade and of the Second Division, and as head of the Service of Supply in France. He was deputy chief of staff of the War Department General Staff before his retirement in 1922. General Harbord was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by both the Army and the Navy and had also been decorated by the French, British, Belgian, Italian, and other governments. After retiring from the Army, he became active in the business world and was chairman of the board of directors of the Radio Corporation of America until July of this year.

Another distinguished member and former patron of the Institute, Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard, died at Governors Island on September 11. General Bullard was graduated from the Military Academy in 1885 and retired from active duty in 1925. After service in the Philippines, Cuba, and on the Mexican border, he was commissioned as Brigadier General in 1917 and subsequently commanded the Second Army of the AEF in France and Luxembourg. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 1918. Much of his time since retirement has been devoted to the National Security

League, of which he was president for more than twenty years.

#### BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING

At a special meeting in Washington on December 11 the Board of Trustees elected the following officers of the Institute: Colonel Joseph I. Green, President; Dr. Troyer S. Anderson, Vice President; and Mr. Lawrence H. Whiting, Treasurer. Mr. Sunderland, Major Lawrence, and Mr. Stansfield continue as Secretary, Editor, and Librarian respectively. The office of Provost remains vacant.

After careful consideration of the Secretary's, Treasurer's, and Editor's reports, the Board agreed to recommend to the membership that annual dues be raised from \$3 to \$3.50. This step, taken very reluctantly, has become necessary to partially offset increases in printing costs. Whether or not the small increase will be sufficient will depend very largely on the success of a planned membership drive.

#### ORDER OF INDIAN WARS AFFILIATES

The Order of Indian Wars of the United States has become an affiliate society of the American Military Institute. After extended negotiations, an agreement effecting this step was approved by the membership of the Order of Indian Wars at its annual meeting on October 1 and by the Trustees of the Institute on December 11. The affiliation is a logical and beneficial move for the advancement of the objectives of both organizations,

which have been closely allied in encouraging the study of the military history of the United States.

Under the terms of the agreement the Institute accepts all members of the Order as annual members with full privileges, such members having the right to retain their identity with the affiliated Order as long as they desire to do so, and the funds of the Order are turned over to the Institute as a trust. Proceeds from the fund thus created are to be used at the discretion of the Institute. In return, the Institute will sponsor one professional meeting each year dealing with a subject pertaining to the American Indian Wars. Although articles on the Indian Wars have been published from time to time in *MILITARY AFFAIRS* in the past, it is hoped that better coverage of this aspect of our history can be given in the future.

The principal officers of the Order of Indian Wars, all residents of Washington, D. C., are: Brigadier General James T. Kerr, Commander; Major General Guy V. Henry, Senior Vice Commander; Colonel Guy S. Norvell, Junior Vice Commander; Brigadier General Charles D. Roberts, Recorder and Treasurer; and Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Merrick, Historian.

#### COLONEL KEMPER TO HEAD ANDOVER

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Kemper, Trustee of the Institute and first chief of the War Department's Historical Branch during World War II, has been appointed Headmaster of Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts, to succeed Dr. Claude M. Fuess. Colonel Kemper was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1935 and taught history there from 1939 to 1942. While a member of the West Point faculty he took his M.A. in history at Columbia University.

When the Historical Branch, G-2, now the Historical Division, Army Special Staff,

was organized in 1943, Colonel Kemper was given the job of organizing it. His splendid work during the next two years won him his first Legion of Merit and a host of friends among historians. He was awarded the Oak Leaf Cluster while assigned to G-3, AFHQ, in Italy. After the end of hostilities in Europe, he returned to the Historical Division and is now executive assistant to the Chief Historian. He will take over his new duties on July 1.

#### ARMY HISTORY

The first volume of the War Department's *U. S. Army in World War II* was published in October and is available for purchase through the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office. Entitled *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, it describes how the ground army was mobilized and shaped for combat, first by GHQ of the Army and subsequently by the Army Ground Forces. A second volume on *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* is in press and will be out soon. The last two publications in the *American Forces in Action Series* are also in press. These are *Anzio Beachhead* and *From Utah to Cherbourg*. After their appearance, all studies prepared by the War Department Historical Division will be included in the *U. S. Army in World War II*.

On September 1 Dr. F. Stansbury Haydon, a frequent contributor to this journal before the war, replaced Dr. Boyd C. Shafer on the staff of the Historical Division. Dr. Shafer resigned to accept a position on the faculty at the University of Arkansas. Dr. Haydon, who served as a Lieutenant Colonel during the war, has since been teaching at the University of Maine. Dr. Rudolph A. Winaker, elected a Trustee of the Institute earlier this year, has been given leave of absence from the Historical Division to serve on the faculty of the National War College this fall.

### NAVAL HISTORY

The Office of Naval History is now preparing a statistical study tentatively entitled *Facts and Figures, World War II*. Planned as a compilation of pertinent material on a wide range of topics concerning the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard for popular and professional use, it is hoped that it will be ready for publication next spring. Suggestions for phases and sub-topics that should be included are invited by Captain John B. Hefferman, Director of Naval History. At present the major topics include chronologies, organization, officials and officers, money, personnel, ships, planes, bases, supplies, medicine, transportation, and losses.

Both the *Glossary of U. S. Naval Abbreviations* and the *Glossary of U. S. Naval Code Words*, announced in the spring and summer issues, are now available for purchase by the general public through the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office.

### WAR RECORDS

Since the War Production Board, later the Civilian Production Agency, was the chief agency concerned with conversion and control during the war, its records will continue to be of great interest to both scholars and the Government. Most of its records that are considered worthy of permanent preservation have now been deposited in the National Archives, where they are in the custody of the War Records Office. Outstanding among these is the Policy Documentation File, which was designed to bring together in one arrangement an authoritative documentation of the procedures, management, program, and plans of the agency. The bulk of the remainder of the records are in the custody of the Division of Liquidation, Department of Commerce. Although these contain much valuable data, it will be some time before they can be processed to

separate valuable and worthless papers.

The records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey comprise another group of considerable importance that have recently been added to the holdings of the War Records Office.

### MILITARY HISTORY AT PRINCETON

The History Department at Princeton University is devoting a great deal of thought and energy to military history. Dr. Robert G. Albion's connection with the Navy's administrative history program is well known. He has also contributed sections on "The Evolution of Warfare" and "Military History of the United States" to the senior and junior manuals, respectively, of the Army R.O.T.C., about to be issued by the Military Service Publishing Company. Dr. Joseph R. Strayer is a member of the Advisory Committee for the Air Force historical program, and Dr. Jeter A. Isely and Dr. Phillip A. Crowl are engaged in a description and analysis of the development of amphibious warfare by the Marine Corps. Dr. Gordon A. Craig is working on a study of the relations between the German army and government under the Weimar Republic.

In addition to this faculty activity, a number of senior theses embodying original research have been written this year. Among those that have already been completed are: R. T. Ely, "Naval Policy under the Early Republic," which won the Joline Prize; W. C. Campbell, "The Army General Staff and Staff Education"; L. B. Bell, "Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan (SC)"; C. B. Schaff, "Stardom from Iowa: The Life and Times of Admiral Harry E. Yarnell"; L. B. Lewis, "Militarism and the German Army, 1871-1918"; H. S. Barrows, "The Roman Army and the Republic"; and E. H. Shafer, "The Sullivan Expedition, 1779." Copies of these are on file in the History Department, and others are now in preparation.



## NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

### CHANGES IN PROVIDING FOR ARMY ENLISTED MEN

(1846 — 1946)

In January 1846 Richard Packenham, British Minister in Washington, received a request from London for information "from authentick sources . . . respecting the Military force of the United States."<sup>1</sup> Packenham lost no time in finding the information which was to be submitted to Her Majesty's armed forces. He informed Henry Unwin Addington, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in London, that he had obtained the facts from General George Gibson, "a highly respectable old officer who presides over the 'subsistence Department of the Army'." Therefore, "entire confidence" could be placed in the accuracy of the data.<sup>2</sup>

By comparing Packenham's 1846-7 report with present-day practices, it is possible to see graphically just what changes have taken place during one hundred years in regard to pay, clothing allotments, daily food rations, cost of rations, laundry facilities, and other details.<sup>3</sup> With Congressional committees trying to draft legislation which will improve the lot of the American GI, and with other groups scrutinizing the "caste" system, any light on the betterment of the enlisted man of the United States Army is of especial interest at this time.

<sup>1</sup>Richard Packenham to Viscount Palmerston, Jan. 28, 1847, British Foreign Office Records, 5/469.

<sup>2</sup>Richard Packenham to Henry Unwin Addington, Feb. 23, 1847, British FO Records, 5/469.

<sup>3</sup>This study is confined to the status of the soldier within the continental limits of the United States although this country had troops on foreign soil at both times.

The first matter of concern for the normal enlisted man in the United States is usually his pay. Packenham reported that the remuneration of a private in the infantry was  $23\frac{1}{13}$  cents per day, or \$84.00 for an entire year.<sup>4</sup> This was paid to the soldiers every two months. In contrast, the present American soldier with the rank of private now receives \$75.00 monthly, or more than ten times the earlier amount. In addition to this, he has, since the present emergency began, been receiving allotments for his dependents.

The following table shows comparative clothing issues for 1846 and 1945, as well as the cost of each item:

CLOTHING ISSUES  
1846

No. of Items <sup>5</sup>	Item	Cost per Item
2	Uniform caps and trimmings	\$1.72½
1	Forage cap and letter	.99½
3	Uniform coats	5.70
5	Woolen jackets	2.66
4	Cotton jackets	.62
10	Woolen overalls	2.28
15	Cotton overalls	.47½
10	Cotton shirts	.43
10	Flannel shirts	.90
6	Flannel drawers	.35½
20	Pairs laced boots	2.44
20	Pairs stockings	.24½
1	Great coat	6.93
3	Blankets	2.22
3	Pairs straps for great coat	.05
2	Leather stocks	.10
3	Pairs shoulder straps	.38

1945

No. of Item <sup>6</sup>	Item	Cost per Item <sup>7</sup>
1	Cap, field, cotton, OD w/visor.....	\$1.05
1	Cap, garrison, OD .....	.83
1	Cap, garrison, Khaki .....	.44
1	Cap, herringbone twill .....	.42
1	Coat, wool, serge, OD .....	11.73
1	Field jacket .....	9.69
2	Jackets, herringbone twill .....	2.35
2	Wool trousers, OD .....	6.70
4	Cotton trousers, khaki .....	2.60
2	Trousers, herringbone twill .....	1.98
4	Cotton shirts, khaki .....	2.27
2	Flannel shirts, OD .....	5.11
2	Wool drawers .....	1.43
5	Cotton drawers .....	.46
2	Undershirts, wool .....	1.33
5	Undershirts, cotton .....	.32
2	Pairs service shoes .....	4.70
1	Pair overshoes .....	2.62
3	Pairs cotton socks .....	.20
3	Pairs light wool socks .....	.41
1	Wool overcoat .....	14.78
1	Raincoat .....	5.47
2	Blankets .....	7.99
1	Pair gloves, wool, OD, leather faced .....	1.48
5	Handkerchiefs .....	.06
2	Neckties .....	.26
2	Leggings, canvas .....	.93
1	Web belt .....	.20
1	Set insignia .....	.08

From this tabulation it becomes immediately apparent that there are a number of articles which have been added to a GI's basic equipment. For instance, the average private in this war has been issued a raincoat, field jacket, overshoes (dependent upon geographical location), a belt, handkerchiefs, gloves, and other items with which his counterpart a hundred years ago did not have to worry

<sup>4</sup>Data for 1846 are from Pakenham's report to Ad-dington, Feb. 23, 1847.

<sup>5</sup>This is the total for a five-year period.

<sup>6</sup>This is based upon the equipment issued to the average enlisted man upon entering service.

<sup>7</sup>Taken from War Department, Army Service Forces, Office of the Quartermaster General, *Data on Cost of Equipping and Maintaining a Soldier One Year*, March 15, 1945.



Voltigeur and Infantrymen of the Regular Army in field uniform 1841-1851. From a drawing by H. A. Ogden in *The Uniform of the Army of the United States, 1774 to 1889*, Quartermaster General.

on inspection day. It is also evident that the cost of much of a soldier's gear has increased a great deal; a blanket now costs more than 3½ times as much, while cotton shirts have undergone a more than five-fold increase in price.

The total clothing cost for a private in 1846 (exclusive of blankets) averaged \$23.94 per year for five years. It is difficult to approach a comparable figure today. In 1945 it cost the government \$212.00 to provide clothing for a soldier's first year in the army.<sup>8</sup> The expenditures for subsequent years are not, of course, this much. The soldier in both periods has been supplied his clothing without charge. However, in 1846 the value of any article not drawn during a soldier's enlistment was paid to him upon his discharge. In contrast to this, there is no established total number of items that a man now receives during his army career; replacements are made as each individual needs them.

Every soldier "growses" at some time or another about his food. In 1846 there was even more reason for complaining, though, as there was less variety. Standard rations were twelve ounces of pork or bacon, or one and one-fourth pounds of fresh beef; eighteen ounces of flour or fresh bread or one pound of pilot bread<sup>9</sup> or one and one-fourth pounds of corn meal. For every hundred rations, provisions were issued at the rate of eight quarts of beans or ten pounds of rice; six pounds of coffee; twelve pounds of sugar; four gallons of vinegar; one and one-half pound of candles; four pounds of soap, and two quarts of salt. The provisions were described by Mr. Packenham as being of the "best quality literally." In addition to the above commodities, pickles, fresh potatoes, and onions were often furnished.

Now master menus are provided three months in advance by the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington, D. C., but these need not be followed. Canned goods are received from quartermaster de-

pots throughout the country while each camp buys its fresh fruits and vegetables from local sources. In 1846 the cost per soldier for daily rations ranged from 8 or 9 cents to 16 or 18 cents. In the latter case the expense would be due to greater costs of transportation. The average cost both on the frontier and the seaboard for years had not exceeded 13 or 14 cents, however. During 1945 it cost an average of 62 cents per day to feed each man regular rations.<sup>10</sup> Of the special rations, "C" rations cost \$.6483 per unit in March 1943, while "K" rations were costing \$.5369 at the time.<sup>11</sup>

The British Foreign Office was also informed about laundry facilities; there was one laundress for every eighteen or twenty men.

Although Packenham's report was exactly what the British "wished to have" and proved to be "very useful," there were a few points to be cleared up. Therefore, Secretary Addington wrote again, asking certain specific questions to which Packenham wrote answers on the margin of the letter and returned in a short time. These questions and answers were:

"1. What is the proportion of women [laundresses] allowed for every 100 men? A. Five.

"2. What number of women receive Rations?

"3. What number of women are permitted to reside and sleep in the Barrack-rooms? A. [To questions 2 and 3] Five for every 100 men and they may sleep in barracks, but there are usually distinct quarters where married soldiers are allowed to live. Each laundress receives 50 cents a month from every soldier that she washes for and

<sup>8</sup>War Department News Release, "Equipping and Maintaining a Soldier in U. S. Costs \$533.88 First Year in Army," 1945.

<sup>9</sup>Hard tack.

<sup>10</sup>War Department News Release.

<sup>11</sup>Harold W. Thatcher, *The Development of Special Rations for the Army*, Historical Section, General Administrative Services Division, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1944.



fuel and soap from the soldier's allowance.

"4. Does the American soldier receive his Ration, in addition to his pay, free of expenses. . . ? A. His ration is in addition to his pay & free of all expenses. . . . When any item of the ration can not be supplied, the soldier is *not* paid for it, as the ration is not an 'emolument'."<sup>12</sup> These replies apparently answered the questions of the home office satisfactorily, as this was the last of the correspondence on the subject.

This comparison of the status of an enlisted man leads to two conclusions. First, the cost of maintaining each soldier has been multiplied a number of times during the past century. Second, the contrast of the two periods shows that the general state of

a private has improved considerably. It is probable, however, that further attempts will also be made to make life in the Army even more attractive to the young men of America.

One point quite aside from the improvements for the enlisted man should not be overlooked in connection with Packenham's report. Here is evidence of a modern intelligence system in operation one hundred years ago. Present-day intelligence units in most countries, among other things, attempt to learn all they can of the armed forces of other nations, both friend and enemy. At the present, military attachés in foreign countries usually do the reporting. It was in this capacity that Richard Packenham was acting. This is an early indication of how the British have attempted to learn all they could of other countries' armies and thus build up their enviable intelligence system.

HOMER L. CALKIN

<sup>12</sup>Memorandum returned with letter from Richard Packenham to Henry Addington, April 28, 1847, British FO Records, 5/470.

\* \* \* \*

"The German High Command and the Invasion of France," MILITARY AFFAIRS, Fall, 1947.

The following letter, dated November 4, 1947, has been received from Dr. Gerhard Loose:

In carefully reading over my article I have come upon two errors which disturb me:

Page 159, 1st paragraph: Westphal's rank was "General" and not *Generalleutnant*." The U. S. equivalent is Lt. Gen. This error is repeated in the caption on page 162. Your references may have indicated *Generalleutnant* yet it is a fact that Westphal was promoted just a few months before V-E Day.

Page 159, footnote number two: Rundstedt was never "charged with the supervision of the disarmed German forces in southern Germany." It was rather Westphal and his staff who were given this task by U. S. Seventh Army.

*The War Department, German Order of Battle, March 1945, gave Westphal's rank as "Generalleutnant," his rank at the time of his participation in the German defense of Normandy with which the article is concerned. Dr. Loose, by virtue of his unique advantage in personally interviewing Westphal in May, 1945, was consequently able to obtain the latest information on the status of his rank.*

*Dr. Loose is correct. A recheck of Army records reveals that the editorial footnote was in error. In May 1945 a SHAEF liaison team appointed Westphal Commanding General Southern Zone, German Army. As such he directed German troops to internment and discharge centers in the U. S. Third and Seventh Army sectors.*

*We thank Dr. Loose for bringing these discrepancies to our attention.*

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### SOME RECENT ITALIAN PUBLICATIONS REGARDING WORLD WAR II\*

By HOWARD MCGAW SMYTH†

Of the members of the late Tripartite Pact, Italy is the only nation to have her sovereignty restored by conclusion of a treaty of peace, to be able to undertake her own national reconstruction, spiritual as well as material, and to cast a glance back and re-assess her experiences in World War II. Although a great deal of information and documentary material has come out of Germany and Japan concerning strategic decisions, military operations and the economic aspects of the war, this has been primarily in the form of captured enemy documents, facts revealed in the course of war-criminal trials, and interrogations. Only in Italy has there been opportunity and occasion for the issuance of

personal accounts by leading participants: opportunity afforded by the continuance of an Italian national government even under Allied occupation; and occasion because of the polemic regarding the responsibility for Italy's catastrophic defeat and humiliating experience as an occupied country. Although with the passing of time there will doubtless be many more revelations by Italian generals and politicians, several books and accounts have already appeared which throw a great deal of light on various aspects of Italy's part in World War II.

Mussolini himself led off with his brochure, *Il tempo del bastone e della carota: storia di un anno, ottobre 1942—settembre 1943* (The Time of the Stick and the Carrot: The History of a Year, October 1942—September 1943), published as a supplement to the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, August 9, 1944. Most recent Italian writers who in any way touch on the question of the causes of Fascist Italy's defeat give first place to the ineptitude of Mussolini's leadership—the mistake of ever entering the war on the wrong side. Not so Mussolini, who offers his own explanation in accordance with the

\*Benito Mussolini, *Il tempo del bastone e della carota: storia di un anno, ottobre 1942—settembre 1943*. Milan. 1944.

Leonardo Simoni, *Berlino, ambasciata d'Italia, 1939-1943*. Rome. 1946.

Carlo Favagrossa, *Perchè perdemmo la guerra: Mussolini e la produzione bellica*. Milan. 1946.

Giuseppe Gariboldi Farina, *Follie delle folle: Sunto storico, militare, sociale e politico della seconda grande guerra mondiale*. Rome. 1945.

Giacomo Carboni, *L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma: Verità e menzogne*. Rome. 1945.

Giuseppe Castellano, *Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile*. Rome. 1945.

Francesco Rossi, *Come arrivammo all'armistizio. Cerenusco sul Naviglio*. 1946.

Paola Monelli, *Roma, 1943*. Rome. 1945.

Mario Rotta, *Otto milioni di baionette: L'esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944*. Milan. 1946.

Pietro Badoglio, *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale: Memorie e documenti*. Milan. 1946.

†Dr. Smyth prior to assuming duties with the Historical Division, War Department, taught Italian history at the University of California. He is now engaged in research and writing on the official history of the American campaign in Italy during World War II.

canons of Fascist-Nazi mythology. The entering wedge for the disruption of Axis power in the Mediterranean and for the overthrow of his régime was furnished by the Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy in France which prepared the way for the Allied landings in North Africa (p. 1). The army and the monarchy took up the work of betrayal from within; the army refused to defend Pantelleria and Sicily; the monarchy in co-operation with the enemies of Italy engineered the *coup d'état* with the assistance of the traitor Grandi.

Written at the time when Mussolini had been restored to power by German force as head of the Italian Social Republic, his account finds no fault with Hitler or with the Nazi direction of the war except between the lines, with the implied criticism of failure to root out the last vestiges of anti-Axis sentiment in France and in the French colonies. There is no reference to "parallel war," the concept used during the initial period to shield Italian national susceptibilities from the fact of German domination. Hitler is defended: the Germans are given credit for generous supplies to Italy. There is no mention of the conflict between Fascist Italy's Mediterranean conception of the war as essentially against France and Britain, and Hitler's continental strategy of concentration against Russia as the fundamental foe. Even the plan of sacrificing the peninsula and making a last stand in the Po Valley is defended, and attributed to the time of the Grand Council meeting (p. 17). There is not even a suggestion of Mussolini's desperate pleas in the spring of '43 for a separate Axis peace with Soviet Russia. Despite its omissions and distortions Mussolini's account of the "time of the stick and the carrot" reveals a great deal. It is a first hand account of the Grand Council meeting, even if biased. At his last audience with the King, Mussolini, by his own admission, was naïf: he, the great advocate

of violence, sought to dissuade the king from dismissing him by appeal to the text of the law establishing the Grand Council of Fascism (p. 19). Mussolini prints the texts of the letters exchanged with Marshal Badoglio (p. 20); describes his peregrinating imprisonment; and concludes with his rescue from the Gran Sasso by German paratroopers.

Leonardo Simoni, who occupied an important position in the Italian embassy in Berlin throughout the early period of the war, first under Ambassador Attolico and then under Alfieri, has published his diary, *Berlino, ambasciata d'Italia, 1939—1943* (Berlin, Embassy of Italy, 1939-1943), (Rome. 1946). It has every appearance of genuineness although probably the original manuscript was somewhat reduced for publication. It constitutes an important source regarding wartime Berlin and the Nazi leaders. It confirms the authenticity of many of the communications between Mussolini and Hitler which have begun to be published and complements in detail many of the revelations of the *Ciano Diaries*. The entries by Simoni extend from October 19, 1939 to September 9, 1943 (the day after announcement by General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio of the armistice of Italy with the United Nations). Thus it covers the last eight months of the period after Ciano had left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and when the ties between Rome and Berlin were strained to the breaking point. Ciano alludes to his efforts in the winter of 1942—43 to persuade Mussolini and Hitler of the imperative necessity of a separate peace with the Soviet Union if the Fascist and Nazi régimes were to survive. Simoni's entries go further and trace the unrealistic fixation of Hitler's mind on the defeat of Russia, a strategic concept which left Italy with only token support from the Germans in face of Allied attack. The ultimate consequence was the conversion of the Italian peninsula into a



battlefield in order to protect the German homeland. The transition from the concept of the "European fortress" to that of the "Inner Fortress of Europe" meant the reduction of Italy to a mere external rampart of Germany. Mussolini faced an insoluble dilemma between the 'unconditional surrender' formula of the Western Powers and Hitler's eastern fixation. His pitiful efforts to solve it, his frantic appeals for German help, his inability to escape from Hitler are well revealed by Simoni.

General Carlo Favagrossa was General Commissioner for war production from 1939 until 1943. His book, *Perchè perdemmo la guerra: Mussolini e la produzione bellica* (Why We Lost the War: Mussolini and War Production), (Milan. 1946), is offered to refute the Fascist thesis that the Duce was betrayed by his collaborators. He presents many documents to prove that Mussolini was fully informed of the paucity of Italian war materiel and war potential when the decision to enter the war was being reached. Favagrossa insists that the professional soldiers were averse to the war and advised against undertakings beyond Italy's capacities. The essential explanation of Italy's tragic defeat he places in the mad political decisions by Mussolini against the oft-proffered sober advice of the experts. The Axis was not a partnership, he shows, and the betrayal was by Germany which forced Italy into a powerless position by withholding the military supplies which might have been sent. The Italian army failed because it never enjoyed the arms and equipment necessary for modern warfare. This thesis is easy to prove—after the event.

General Giuseppe Gariboldi Farina has hastened to bring out his account, *Follie delle folle: Sunto storico, militare, sociale e politico della seconda grande guerra mondiale* (Madness of the Mad: Historical Summary, Military, Social and Political of the

Second World War), (Rome. 1945), to demonstrate that Italy's war was all madness. Possibly he might have been able to reveal something of note: but the subtitle is the clue to the book: "Historical summary, military, social and political, of the Second Great World War." He has something to say about everything: he reveals nothing not already known to readers of the daily press.

Of quite a different order is a group of books dealing with the critical year 1943: the overthrow of Fascism, the negotiation of the armistice with the Allies, the transition to co-belligerency. At many points there were real choices and crucial decisions the soundness of which will doubtless be the object of controversy for many years to come. Sufficient facts have already been revealed to render a valid if not definitive history of the period possible. General Giuseppe Castellano was chief of the operations section and a close collaborator with General Ambrosio, head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (*Comando Supremo*). Castellano served in the closing period of the Mussolini régime and in the initial period of Badoglio. His book, *Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile* (How I Signed the Armistice of Cassibile), (Milan. 1945), is chiefly his defense of his negotiations with the Allies, but includes a great deal more. He was the chief instigator and planner of the *coup* which eliminated Mussolini. He tells in detail of his efforts with Ciano to have Ambrosio appointed chief of the *Comando Supremo* in place of Cavallero; how he then sought to convince Ambrosio that a separate peace under Mussolini was impossible and that Mussolini had to be removed. Until the Feltre conference (July 19), however, Ambrosio kept hoping that Mussolini himself would effect a separation from Germany. Just before the conference the Duce promised Ambrosio that he would place the issue of separation before Hitler: but when he met

the Führer, Mussolini said nothing and meekly listened to the usual harangue. Castellano laid the groundwork of the conspiracy and saw to its execution. Only at the last would the King and the Duke d'Acquarone (Minister of the Royal Household) emit certain expressions indicative of encouragement. The great preoccupation of the king was to avoid anything which might incriminate himself in case the plot against Mussolini failed.

With Badoglio in power Castellano bent all his efforts to induce the new régime to seek contact with the Allies, urging that Italy's only hope of salvation lay in the positive course of joining the Allies in attack against the Germans. Castellano himself sounded out the representatives of General Eisenhower at Lisbon in August, received the text of the "short terms" of armistice, and on the authorization of Marshal Badoglio signed the terms at Cassibile on September 3. He urged the Allies to make their landing near Rome but was unsuccessful in his repeated efforts to gain a precise knowledge of Allied plans. He worked out the plan with Allied chieftains for an airborne landing of one division near Rome (GIANT TWO) to be executed simultaneously with the announcement of the surrender on the eve of the Salerno landing. His plans were frustrated by Marshal Badoglio and the commanders in Rome. Castellano himself was surprised by the announcement of the armistice on September 8, believing it would not be before the 12th, the date he suggested to his government. This was Castellano's big blunder. He wrote to Ambrosio after signing the armistice (p. 172):

Although I have done everything possible to gain it, I have not succeeded in obtaining any precise information regarding the locality of the landing. Regarding the date I can say nothing precise; but from confidential information I presume that the landing will take place between the 10th and 15th of September, perhaps on the 12th."

He reached this conclusion, he explains, because he had been told that the primary attack against the peninsula would follow the secondary attack after an interval of a week or two, and General Walter B. Smith had assured him confidentially (on September 3) that the main Allied attack would come within two weeks.

Castellano's account is the essential source regarding the process by which the Italian High Command based its calculations and plans on announcement of the armistice four days or more later than it occurred. Castellano himself accuses General Smith of being "artfully inexact." (p. 173). But in supplementing Castellano's account there has been developed an interpretation of the flight of the Italian "government" and collapse of the defense of Rome with these essential elements:

1) The Allies "agreed," or indicated, or suggested that the date of the announcement of the armistice would be the 12th, or the 15th of September, or possibly later (Badoglio, *Op. cit.*, pp. 103-104, 138; Roatta, *Op. cit.*, pp. 300-301, 310; Farina, *Op. cit.*, p. 192; Monelli, *Op. cit.*, pp. 305-306; Carboni, *Op. cit.*, pp. 25-26; Rossi, *Op. cit.*, pp. 134-135);

2) The Allies then anticipated the "agreed" date by precipitously announcing the armistice on the 8th. Italian writers have found confirmation of this interpretation of a sudden change in Allied plans in the remarks of Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons on September 21, 1943 in refuting the charge that Allied generals were slow in taking advantage of the overthrow of Mussolini: "The date, which had originally been the fifteenth, was, however, in fact brought forward to the night of September eighth."

3) Italian preparations for holding Rome against the Germans and for giving support to the Allies were under way and would have

been completed by 12th or 15th September, but the precipitous action of the Allies caught them only half ready.

4) Hence the Allies were responsible for the sudden decision of the "government" to leave Rome, and for collapse of Italian resistance against the Germans. General Eisenhower is said to have told General Rossi on the night of September 8: "If some mistake has been made, we must now accept the situation as it is." This remark has been interpreted as an admission by the Allies of a great mistake.

As an example of the way the legend of Allied responsibility has tended to become fixed in Italian literature one may cite the work of Secondo Malacoda, *Popolo Fascismo Monarchia* (Rome, 1945), p. 161:

Thus the Allies, . . . with the unexpected announcement which struck the Government and the Supreme Command by surprise, precipitated Italy into the greatest catastrophe of its history, and faced the army with a mortal test against which no army of the world would have been able to stand.

It may be pointed out at this time that this legend of Allied responsibility for the Italian collapse rests on the assumption that the Italians would have been quite free to complete their arrangements for the defense of Rome against the Germans. This is an extraordinary assumption and quite at variance with the usual conduct of the Germans. Before the *coup d'état* of July 25 the *Wehrmachtsführungsstab* had already devised in detail a plan for the military occupation of Italy in case of the overthrow of Mussolini. This plan, ALARICH, was put into execution before Badoglio could consolidate his position and it paralyzed his government in its efforts to make contact with the Allies. Lieutenant Colonel Mario Torsiello presents a very good analysis of this German action in the *Rivista Militare* of July, 1945, entitled, "L'aggressione germanica all'Italia nella sua

fase preliminare, 26 luglio—7 settembre 1943." The documents which emerged from the Nuremberg trials indicate that the German command had another plan in case of a separate agreement of Italy with the Allies, plan ACHSE. The Germans were highly suspicious of Badoglio and of the movement of Italian divisions from France and the Balkans into positions near Rome. General Jodl declared in a lecture given November 7, 1943 that: "In this insupportable position the Führer agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum" (*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Washington, 1946, VII, p. 930).

Castellano himself blames the mission of General Giacomo Zanussi for rendering the Allies unwilling to reveal their plans to the Italian High Command. He states that after his meeting with General Smith and Brigadier K. W. Strong at Lisbon, General Eisenhower was prepared to take him (Castellano) into full confidence regarding Allied plans—perhaps even as to the exact place and hour of the landing at Salerno. But the arrival of Zanussi, an independent emissary, aroused suspicions of the Allied commanders and caused them to keep the essentials of their plans secret (pp. 174-175). The letter of General Smith to Castellano dated December 5, 1943 which is printed in the appendix of Castellano's book (pp. 224-226) does not, however, support in full the statement in the text.

General Giacomo Carboni was commander of the motorized army corps (Centauro, Ariete, Piave, and Granatieri divisions) whose elements were originally assembled about Rome to protect the Badoglio Government against the threat of a Nazi stroke to restore the Fascists. General Carboni met General Maxwell D. Taylor during his secret mission to Rome (September 6-8) to complete arrangements for GIANT TWO, and induced Marshall Badoglio to radio General



Eisenhower that the armistice could not be "accepted." Carboni's book, *L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma: Verità e menzogne* (The Armistice and the Defense of Rome: Truth and Lies), (Rome, 2nd ed., August, 1945) is his defense of his part in the armistice negotiations and explanations of the failure of his corps to defend the capital. He has bitter words for everyone: Castellano, Ambrosio, Roatta, Badoglio, and General W. B. Smith. His trial in 1944 on the charge of failure to defend Rome was, he asserts, a frame-up by the Badoglio-Ambrosio clique. These men skipped out with the King, he writes, while he himself tried to execute the absurd order left by General Roatta to concentrate his army near Tivoli. The subsequent orders which he was supposed to find at Tivoli were never issued. His army corps, Carboni explains, was never in a position to offer effective resistance to the Germans, and this was well known to Ambrosio, Roatta, and Badoglio as well as the fact that he had scarcely any ammunition or gasoline. The collapse, he asserts, was almost inevitable because of the failure of his superiors to make any proper preparation in advance, particularly in the matter of propaganda which would prepare the troops and the officers for an about-face. Despite the vituperative character of his book, Carboni reveals many facts of critical importance regarding the armistice and the Italian collapse.

During the crucial two days of General Taylor's mission to Rome, Ambrosio was out of the city and direction of the *Comando Supremo* devolved upon the Deputy Chief, General Francesco Rossi, whose book, *Come arrivammo all' armistizio* (How We Arrived at the Armistice), (Vernusco sul Naviglio, 1946), fills in some of the gaps of that period. Rossi presents a good account of the general factors leading to the armistice and the growing tension with Germany after Mussolini's overthrow. The dispersion of so

many Italian divisions in France, the Balkans, and in Greece; the weakness of the Italian troops within Italy as against the German divisions which occupied the country as soon as Mussolini was overthrown; fear of the German fifth column—these were the factors which led all Italian military leaders to agree that it was imperative for the Allies to land within striking distance of Rome. Otherwise the Italian divisions alone would be unable to resist the Germans; the capital would immediately be occupied; and a puppet government would be set up by the Nazis and would disavow the armistice arrangements with the Allies. Rossi was surprised by the arrival of General Taylor at Rome on the 7th, and he himself flew back to Algiers with Taylor the next day, hoping to persuade the Allies to postpone announcement of the armistice. Rossi denies what is affirmed by Roatta: that the *Comando Supremo* knew the direction of the Allied attack before the arrival of General Taylor (p. 145). His argument, however, is essentially extrapolation: assuming a convoy speed of ten miles per hour, it would take the Allied fleets only 14 hours from Bizerta to Palermo, and 18 from Palermo to Salerno; and thus reconnaissance on the afternoon of September 7 would only have revealed Allied formations on the sea off Bizerta and Tunis, without any indication of the direction of the attack. Such convoys would look little different from the supply fleets of the Allies which had become customary sights to Italian aviators. The appendix includes minutes of the Tarvis conference (August 6, 1943) and of the Bologna conference (August 15), very interesting points in Italo-German relations during the period of Badoglio.

Paolo Monelli, a journalist, has written an interesting synthesis, *Roma, 1943*, (Rome, 3d ed., September, 1945), covering the disintegration and overthrow of the Fascist régime, the forty-five days of Badoglio, the German

seizure and occupation of Rome. Monelli draws on the materials presented by Castellano and Carboni, his own experiences, observations, and interviews, and some American periodical material such as David Brown's "Inside Story of Italy's Surrender," which appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post*, September 9 and 16, 1944. Monelli gives a careful account of the military conspiracy which led to Mussolini's overthrow, a much more accurate picture than that put forward by Dino Grandi in "Dino Grandi Explains," *Life*, February 26, 1945. The armistice negotiations are treated at length by Monelli, but most attention is given to the brief battle for Rome, September 8-11. General Carboni is the villain of the piece: Ambrosio and Badoglio were victims of his false counsels. The author offers no satisfactory explanation for Ambrosio's absence from Rome during the critical two days, September 6-8: he passes very lightly over the curious conduct of Marshal Badoglio in approving one course on September 3 and its opposite five days later. The Allies were greatly at fault, and to their own detriment, he implies, in not confiding their plans to the Italian leaders (who were still the proclaimed faithful allies of the Germans). The book contains a great deal of information and has been highly praised in Italy and abroad. Monelli defends the hasty departure of the "government" (actually the King, Badoglio, and Generals Ambrosio, Roatta, and Admiral de Courten) from Rome on the morning of September 9. He offers some evidence that the soldiers in Carboni's army corps were willing to fight the Germans and felt betrayed by their officers. The facts presented by Monelli cannot be ignored; but the sum of his interpretations and judgments is such as to make his book good propaganda for the monarchy in the period before the institutional referendum of June, 1946.

General Mario Roatta, who made a sensa-

tional escape from prison in Rome, may have been guilty of war crimes as charged by the Yugoslavs, of Fascist crimes as charged by anti-Fascists, but his book, *Otto milioni di baionette: L'esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944* (*Eight Million Bayonets: The Italian Army in War from 1940 to 1944*), (Milan, 1946) entitles him to the gratitude of students of World War II. Service as military attaché in Berlin before the war made him an important link between the German and Italian high commands. His experiences in Libya, Yugoslavia, and Sicily, and his service as Chief of the Army General Staff after June, 1943 give basis to his facts and judgments. He gives a good factual description of the arms and equipment of the Italian army, utterly inadequate for modern warfare, at the time Mussolini was boasting of eight million bayonets. The whimsicality of Mussolini's decisions to enter the war, to participate in the bombardment of Britain, to send an Italian contingent against Russia, to mobilize for an attack against Yugoslavia and then call it off, is amply portrayed. Roatta was not greatly impressed by the Germans and their use of slogans in place of serious strategic study.

Comparison of the second half of Roatta's book, which deals with the period after the Allied invasion of Sicily, with other memoir material, shows clearly that he was not taken into the confidence of the group which overthrew Mussolini. Roatta was kept half in the dark regarding Castellano's negotiations: his book indirectly reveals the extraordinary distrust which the various members of the government and high command had for each other. Roatta offers an explanation of the about-face of Badoglio between September 3 (when the armistice was signed) and September 8 (when Badoglio radioed General Eisenhower that the armistice could not be "accepted"). On September 6 and 7 the Allied convoys were spotted forming in the

open sea north of Palermo and it was certain that they would not land near Rome (pp. 306-309). As is mentioned above, this fact is specifically denied by Rossi. Roatta also reveals that with Badoglio's approval the order was given to General Carboni not to defend Rome but to move the motorized corps to Tivoli (p. 323).

In order not to reveal its moves to the Germans, the Italian Government allowed few of its own members to share the secrets of the negotiations with the Allies. Possibly Marshal Pietro Badoglio alone knew of all phases of the actions of his subordinates: possibly there was no real central point of control. The Marshal, however, writes from an Olympian height, far above the need of precise detail regarding his own actions in certain crucial events. His *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale: Memorie e documenti* (Italy in the Second World War: Memoirs and Documents), (Milan, 1946) must be compared with other materials if an accurate reconstruction be made of his rôle in the overthrow of Fascism and Italy's switch from the German alliance to co-belligerency with the Allies. Badoglio scarcely mentions Castellano in regard to the *coup d'état* for which he takes, by implication, chief credit. The extent to which the King dictated the policy of Badoglio's government, picking its members in advance and preparing the proclamation that "the war continues," and preventing any representation of anti-Fascist political parties, becomes clear in comparing Badoglio's memoirs (pp. 67-75) with the contemporary notations of Ivanoe Bonomi, *Diario di un anno, 2 giugno 1943-10 giugno 1944* (Cernusco sul Nagiglio, 1947), pp. 16-43. The ambiguity of Badoglio's attitude toward the Allies in authorizing Castellano to sign the armistice on September 3 and in radioing General Eisenhower on September 8 that it could not be "accepted" emerges only after close comparison

of all accounts. Yet the Marshal mentions as his fundamental aim the maintenance of contact with the Allies in order to maintain the armistice, "signed at my order by General Castellano" (p. 115). Having refused GIANT TWO, Badoglio chides the Allies with failure to send an airborne division to Rome (p. 120).

The hasty departure of Badoglio with the King, Ambrosio, Roatta, and Admiral de Courten from Rome on September 9 left General Carboni with only the ambiguous order to move his army corps to Tivoli and await new orders (which were never sent). The rest of the army commanders in Italy and in the Balkans received no orders whatsoever for a couple of days which were critical. Such resistance as was offered against the Germans was local, uncoordinated, and due simply to the initiative of individual commanders. Within a few days only seven divisions (in Sardinia and Southern Italy) were left of the Italian army of some 61 divisions. The extent of the catastrophe is indicated by the German list of divisions disarmed and materials captured (*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VII, 931-935).

Badoglio, however, is quite free with his criticism of Allied strategy and conduct of the war. The assumption, of course, is that the Allies should have fought the war in accordance with the needs of his government. It was a great mistake, he points out, to have occupied Sicily rather than Sardinia from which island a landing could have been directed at the mid-point of the Italian peninsula. It was a strategic error to have made the attack at Salerno so soon after the Eighth Army landed in Calabria:

If General Eisenhower had maintained the 12th as the date of the armistice and of the landing, or better still the 15th, the Fifth Army would have been able to have much better support by the Eighth (p. 138).



The Allied action, Badoglio explains, was slow:

In the first place there was a truly excessive preoccupation to limit the loss of human lives, a most just preoccupation and one which continually struck me during the campaign in East Africa, but which should not surpass determined limits; otherwise it is not waging war. All the Americans repeated with pleasure the same phrase: "To make a man you want twenty years, to make a machine a few hours," hence forward with the machines.

This comment, to say the least, is in bad taste. It reveals, as well as anything, a fundamental defect of the Royal Italian army: the traditional indifference of the officers toward the welfare of their men.

Badoglio further implies that the Allied armies might have made much more rapid progress against the Germans, "true masters

of the art of war," if they had studied mountain warfare as practiced by the Italian army. The second part of Badoglio's book deals with the many difficulties which he encountered as head of the government of an occupied country. The Italians were willing and able, he seeks to show, to make a great military contribution in the war against Germany after they were recognized as co-belligerents on October 13, 1943, but Allied high policy severely limited the forces they were allowed to put in the field. There is also the complaint that the Allies did not furnish the Italians with the arms and equipment which would have enabled them to perform great feats in the anti-German phase of the war. It is essentially the same complaint as is made against the Germans for the first phase of World War II.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Marshall: Citizen Soldier*, by William Frye. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1947. Pp. 373. \$3.75.)

During the past eight years George Catlett Marshall has been the subject of scores of magazine and newspaper articles, some of them running to considerable length. For the most part these have presented fairly accurate and useful profiles of their subject, but even the best of them—based as they are on limited and easily accessible sources—lack depth and fall short in their reflection of the less obvious facets of the Marshall character. William Frye has had the courage to tackle an ambitious full length biography and to essay a searching character analysis, and that without access to important documents not presently available to biographers and historians. The resulting product discloses an impressive array of equipment for such an undertaking: a gift for discovering hitherto untapped sources, an ability to select and synthesize, and an effective, and at times arresting, talent for interpreting men and events. This is no get-rich-quick attempt to cash in early on the fame of a distinguished public figure but a conscientious, balanced, and thoughtful study, soundly based and well presented.

Approximately two-thirds of the book deals with Marshall's life and service prior to his ap-

pointment as Chief of Staff. Less skillfully handled, this phase of the story might easily be dull or, worse yet, recite a plethora of blown up incidents and half apocryphal anecdotes with glamor the object—a not uncommon device in writing "popular" biographies. Frye avoids both pitfalls. He uses incidents and anecdotes as they should be used to carry the story and illuminate the character of the subject, but he steers clear of exaggeration and fabrication. The boy George does not stand forth as a prodigy, and Marshall the shavetail gives only occasional indications of military genius. Even George Marshall, Chief of Staff and organizer of victory, does not emerge as a paragon of all the virtues and a military oracle with all the answers. One quote will serve to show something of the realistic quality of Frye's treatment of his hero:

As Marshall's continued and demonstrated interest in the enlisted men who had served under him at any time was both a sincere and natural attitude and a calculated gesture, so were his simplicity and modesty at once natural and studied.

"Marshall is the most accomplished actor in the Army," said one who was closely associated with him over a long period. "Everybody thinks MacArthur is but he's not. The difference be-

tween them is that you always know MacArthur is acting."

Interesting and informative as the earlier chapters are, it is the last third of the book—the part which deals with the preparation for and participation in World War II—that is most absorbing. Here we are taken behind the scenes of top level conferences and negotiations and shown what went on when the high brass foregathered with each other and with their heads of state to formulate major decisions, compose differences, and iron out details. William Frye, for all that certain top secret documents and personal papers were not at his disposal, obviously had access to sources of information which furnished him a wealth of first-hand material for many a fascinating and convincing inside story of how "enterprises of great pith and moment" were set in motion out of a welter of opposing ideas, inter-service prejudices, conflicting interests, and clashing wills. He deals with the personalities of the makers of history frankly and fairly, and his reporting of the stands they took and the things they said carries the impress of accuracy and authenticity.

There is no striving for sensationalism in Frye's work. His purpose is to tell the life story to date of a great soldier and a great patriot, to analyze his character, and to evaluate his service to his country. On all these counts he has done a thoroughly workmanlike job. George Marshall is fortunate in his first biographer.

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**The Battle for Leyte Gulf**, by C. Vann Woodward. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1947. Pp. xii, 244. \$4.00.)

**The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation**, by James A. Field, Jr. (Princeton: University Press. 1947. Pp. xiv, 162. \$2.50.)

The Battle for Leyte Gulf was the greatest naval engagement of all time. The conduct of the operation will therefore be a subject of keen and enduring interest, especially to the strategist and the naval historian. It took place in the air, on the sea, and under the sea, in "encounters separated by as much as a thousand miles," (Field, p. vii), between fleets of the United States and Japan. The Sho Operation, as the Japanese plan for the defense of the Philippine Islands was

called, resulted from the decision of the Japanese Naval General Staff to throw virtually its entire fleet into an effort to intercept the American landings. A series of engagements from 23 to 26 October 1944 led to a victory so decisive that, according to Admiral Ozawa of the Japanese Navy, "The [Japanese] surface forces became strictly auxiliary, so that we relied on land forces for special attack, and air power. . . . There was no further use assigned to surface vessels, with the exception of some special ships." (Woodward, p. 230; underscoring is that of Woodward.)

Japanese lost twenty-six combatant ships, while the United States lost but six. The disastrous defeat of the Japanese may be laid to several causes: lack of coordinated command between air and naval forces; inadequate air strength; incompetent commanders; and technical inferiority.

Neither of these studies of the Battle for Leyte Gulf makes any claim to being a definitive work on the subject. This reviewer feels, however, that both authors, within their self-imposed limits, have come close to achieving that objective. Mr. Woodward, who was an Intelligence Officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations during the war, presents a complete picture of both sides of the naval battle and has obviously drawn his material from an amazing number of both American and Japanese sources. The result is an absorbing study which begins with the sortie of the Japanese fleet which details the four major engagements of the battle and concludes with a critical analysis of the causes of the Japanese defeat.

Mr. Field confines himself to "the elucidation of the planning and execution of Japan's great attempt to throw back the American advance across the Pacific. . . ." Consequently, he deals only with the actions of the American fleets only so far as is necessary to explain the Japanese behavior. Since he took part in the post-war interrogation of officers of the Japanese fleets which had participated in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, Mr. Field is exceptionally well qualified for writing the account of the Sho Operation, and he has made full and competent use of both the interrogations and the original Japanese records.

Comparisons are dangerous, but as they inevitably be made between the two works, they might point out that Mr. Field's approach is that of the student of naval strategy, while Mr. Woodward writes from the point of view of a highly skillful historian. Both studies are exceedingly valuable in their respective and complementary fields. Mr. Woodward's treatment, however,

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or a livelier tone and for the introduction of human interest stories to lighten the narrative. At times he becomes critical of both American and Japanese commanders. This too makes for a more lively reading. Mr. Field tends to be more positive in his appraisals. The book contains magnificent photographs and excellent indices. A short but adequate bibliography, such as that appended to Mr. Field's book, would have been a useful addition to Mr. Wood's study.

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*American Military Government in Germany*, by Harold Zink. (New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp. 272. \$4.00.)

The author of this volume, a professor of political science in De Pauw University, served as a military affairs officer with the Army from 1943 to 1945. After going through the Military Government training schools in this country he was assigned to the German Country Unit of the Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, a combined staff established to plan military operations during the combat period. Its most notable achievement was the editing of the *EF Handbook for Military Government in Germany* for which Professor Zink acted as an editorial editor. When in preparation for the post-hostilities period the US Group, Military Control Council for Germany, was organized the author became a consultant to this agency which was accompanied to Berlin.

Professor Zink's experiences with MG gave him an excellent opportunity for studying the operational role of MG in the European Theater till 1946. The book is full of useful information and critical thought with regard to these aspects. Coming from an experienced educator Zink's analysis of the MG schools is particularly interesting. I am inclined to agree with him that the staffs at Charlottesville, Custer, and the various CATS schools did a creditable job considering the scarcity of teaching personnel and the time limits imposed by the war. His judgment that much less was achieved by the training center in Shrivenham is equally correct.

The book contains the best description of MG organization and operations during the combat and immediate post-hostilities period that has been published so far. It is less adequate in its presenta-

tion of the earlier MG planning and of the subsequent OMGUS period. The author obviously had little contact with the activities of the higher national and inter-Allied agencies and his statements in this respect are vague and at times misleading. JCS 1067 was not issued after Potsdam, but more than two months before. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department was not established "early in the war" at the same time with the MG Section of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, but more than a year thereafter. As a matter of fact, a major reason for the delay in the planning and coordination of MG operations lay in this belated creation of an MG staff on the highest Army level. It should also be mentioned that there were no American MG operations in North Africa, as Mr. Zink suggests.

The author is more on his own ground in discussing the program of denazification, reeducation, and democratization. He is rather non-committal with regard to the results of denazification. He is more specific in criticizing the relative weakness of the attention paid by American MG to educational and cultural affairs. The chapter on democratization deals with the introduction of democratic forms of government, such as elections, parties, state constitutions, while rightly emphasizing that democratization will remain a merely formal achievement without the simultaneous creation of a social and economic foundation. But the very superficial treatment of the economic and social problems of the occupation which follows comes as a sort of anticlimax. Reparations and the lagging coal production, in all probability the two problems which have dominated the state of German economy since VE-day, are not even mentioned.

On the whole Mr. Zink concentrates on operations rather than on policies. The operational aspect has found little attention among the public. Moreover, the American press, in the fall of 1945, in one of the most irresponsible moments of its history, unleashed a truly reckless campaign against the men who with few exceptions carried the burden of the operational job with unselfish devotion and with considerable success. It was high time that one of them should present to us their viewpoints, achievements, and agonies. Indeed, they had every right to feel frustrated at times, and maybe most of the time. The endless waiting for policy directions during the planning period in 1944, the steady and often fruitless struggle to gain recognition for MG within the Army, the failure to organize MG on a firm and

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independent basis soon after VE-day, and the ensuing danger of having MG thrown into complete confusion by the turmoil of redeployment and demobilization—all these experiences were bound to affect the morale of the MG officers in the field.

But MG is a means to an end, a largely tactical one during combat, a political one thereafter, and the greatest operating efficiency would serve no useful purpose if these ends were ill-defined. Professor Zink tends to lump together all these political considerations under the single heading "coordination." He hardly ever takes issue with the policy decisions made, but castigates instead the slowness with which they were arrived at. However, President Roosevelt could hardly have solved by mere fiat the complex task of "coordinating" American public opinion with regard to American post-war policy in Germany and of "coordinating" Churchill and Stalin. These were not problems of administrative technique but of political substance and their solution unhappily could not always be timed in accordance with operational needs. Undoubtedly, there were unnecessary delays in policy making, but an objective historical appraisal would require a more comprehensive study of MG.

Similarly it appears doubtful whether the author, considering his own practical experiences, is not occasionally carried away by his emotions in describing the general attitude of the Army toward MG. His invectives against the "top-brass" have some punch, but are somewhat monotonous and in the end not very illuminating. For example it was largely civilian opposition that kept the Army from starting its MG preparations on the highest level in 1942 and held the scope of Army planning and training down for almost two years. Or, to turn to a different aspect: the Army has managed civilian supplies with a remarkable efficiency. Even now there is no organization in sight that could take over these services.

These are just two examples to show that a valid judgment on Army performance would call for a broader view than shown in the book. Occasionally I felt that Professor Zink wanted to prove that in our democratic Army griping was not a privilege of the GI's but could also be freely indulged in by senior officers. Maybe this adds realistic color to the history of the War, and in any event this lively and straightforward book is an important source for the study of American MG in Germany during the early period.

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*Revolution in Warfare*, by B. H. Liddell Hart.  
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1947.  
Pp. 125. \$2.00.)

In this small volume Captain Liddell Hart draws on his great store of military history to present a challenging account of past and present developments of warfare, as well as giving us a glimpse into the dark future of the Atomic Age. There is much in his writing which will interest the historian and the military student, but it is unlikely that either will accept many of the lessons which the author sets out to draw.

The fact is that Liddell Hart's passion for establishing the doctrine which he has pursued for the past twenty-five years, that defense is superior to offense as a strategy of war, prevents him from approaching his subject with an unbiased mind. Even when he reviews the events of World War II he is inclined to sustain his theory, claiming that the great offensive successes of the Nazis in Poland and Western Europe in 1939-1940, by the Russians from 1943 onwards and by the Allies in the final phases of the war, were only made possible because of overwhelming superiority of the attacker or to the effect of passive dispersion or active distraction of the defender. Yet, on occasions, the author pays tribute to offensive action, though even here he sees a "cunning blend of defence with attack," which, surely, must be the aim of every offensive-minded commander.

On the other hand, the chapter on the atomic bomb provides a lucid exposition of the effect which the advent of this new weapon will have on the composition and character of armed forces of the future. The problem is considered as a whole, militarily and politically, and the suggested ways and means of meeting it are in accordance with present day official doctrine.

The author arrives at the conclusion that, as yet, there is no prospect of averting future wars, and that all we can hope for is a world-wide system of qualitative disarmament.

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